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Participatory Litigation:
A New Framework for
Impact Lawyering
Jules Lobel*
Abstract. This Article argues that the manner in which class-action and impact lawyers
have traditionally litigated leaves little room for class participation in lawsuits, and that a
new, participatory framework can and should be adopted. Through the story of a
successful class-action suit challenging California’s use of prolonged solitary confinement
in its prisons, the Article demonstrates that plaintiff participation is both possible and
important.
Academic literature has assumed that broad plaintiff participation in class-action and
impact litigation is not achievable. Yet this Article describes how, in a key California case,
attorneys actively involved the plaintiffs in all aspects of the litigation: choosing class
* Bessie McKee Walthour Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. I want

to thank my research assistants, Alex Downs, Sarah V. Itzkoff, Alex Wilkerson, Julie
Casey, Jaden Rankin-Wahlers, Andrew Calve, and Amira Montasser El Sawi for their
research help, the University of Pittsburgh School of Law’s Document Technology
Center for its work preparing this Article, and University of Pittsburgh law librarians
Karen Sheppard and Kezia Lukombo for the help in submitting the Article. I also want to
thank Dean Amy Wildermuth of Pitt Law for her support of this project.
The litigation that this Article recounts could not have been successfully undertaken
without the inspiring and courageous collective solidarity and wisdom of those
incarcerated at Pelican Bay State Prison, along with the tremendous work done by my
colleagues at the Center for Constitutional Rights, Rachel Meeropol, Samuel Miller,
Alexis Agathocleous, Azure Wheeler, Britany Thomas, our cooperating attorneys, Carol
Strickman, Anne Weills, Marilyn McMahon, Charles Carbone, Rebecca Rabkin, Carmen
Bremer, Greg Hull, Carole Travis, Matthew Strugar, Anne Cappella, and paralegals Claire
Dailey and Linda Nakanishi. I thank my colleagues Jessie Allen and Deborah Brake, as
well as Bill Quigley, Ellen Yaroshevsky, David Rudovsky, Samuel Miller, Rachel
Meeropol, Carmen Bremer, Scott Morgenstern, Eve Wider, George Loewenstein, Art
McDonald, Margaret Randall, Alice and Staughton Lynd, Terry Kupers, William Simon,
William B. Rubenstein, Steve Schnapp, Todd Ashker, Gabriel Reyes, and Paul Redd for
their helpful comments on drafts of the Article. The comments by participants of the
Incarceration and the Law Roundtable were also very useful. Finally, I especially want to
thank my wife Karen Engro for her insightful comments and editorial suggestions on
drafts of the Article, and her encouragement of the project from beginning to end.

87

Participatory Litigation
74 STAN. L. REV. 87 (2022)

representatives, deciding on claims to present, making important tactical decisions,
negotiating and ratifying a settlement agreement, and monitoring the settlement decree.
The Article also describes how the California lawsuit resulted from, and interacted with, a
prisoners’ movement that conducted three mass hunger strikes and garnered national and
international attention. Ultimately, the Article uses the California narrative to develop a
theory of participatory litigation that infuses political and legal representation with
grassroots involvement.
Theories of political and legal representation have oscillated between a mandate form of
representation, where the representative directly supports her constituents’ views; an
interest form of representation, where the representative is presumed to have the same
interests as those she represents; and an accountability form of representation, where
constituents or clients delegate broad discretion to the representative subject to periodic
voting or another mechanism for removal. Participatory litigation, in contrast, allows for
collaborative, collective, and consensus-building interactions between the representative
and those she represents. In this model, the representative and the client teach and learn
from one another.
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Introduction
Imagine being confined in an eight-by-ten-foot windowless cell for
twenty-two hours a day. Phone calls and contact visits with family and friends
are prohibited. You only leave for approximately one and a half hours a day for
recreation alone in an empty area somewhat larger than your cell, containing
twenty-foot-high walls and a partial grate roof with little direct sunlight. You
communicate with surrounding prisoners in a disembodied manner by
shouting through your cell walls. There are no educational or vocational
programs, and you have not seen trees, birds, or grass, nor meaningfully
touched another human, for years.1
By 2011, more than 1,000 men at California’s Pelican Bay State Prison
Security Housing Unit (SHU) had spent years in this condition. At the time,
approximately 500 prisoners had been in solitary confinement for more than
ten years, with seventy-eight prisoners there for over two decades.2 Prison
officials had not placed these prisoners in solitary confinement because of
serious misconduct in prison or because of the heinousness of their criminal
offenses. Instead, officials placed the prisoners in solitary confinement based on
alleged association with a prison gang. Being an alleged gang member was not
even necessary: Anyone labeled an “associate,” defined as someone who is
periodically involved with gang members, could be put in the SHU.3 Tattoos,
artwork, and letters sufficed for SHU placement.4 Prison officials reviewed
placement decisions only once every six years,5 and virtually all prisoners so
reviewed were perfunctorily retained in solitary.6 The only way out of the
SHU was release from prison, becoming an informant, or death; in the
vernacular, to “parole, snitch, or die.”7 Prisoners serving a life sentence were

1. See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 3, 39-40, 45, 47-48, 58, 63-67, Ruiz v.

2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Brown, No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2012), ECF No. 136; KERAMET REITER, 23/7:
PELICAN BAY PRISON AND THE RISE OF LONG-TERM SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 2, 4, 10, 19,
26-28 (2016) (describing conditions at the Pelican Bay State Prison Security Housing
Unit).
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 33; Julie Small, Under Scrutiny,
Pelican Bay Prison Officials Say They Target Only Gang Leaders, 89.3 KPCC (Aug. 23,
2011), https://perma.cc/Y7H8-SUTA.
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 92, 94; CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15,
§ 3378(c)(4) (2011).
REITER, supra note 1, at 2.
See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 96-99.
See id. ¶¶ 100-103, 120-122.
Keramet A. Reiter, Parole, Snitch, or Die: California’s Supermax Prisons and Prisoners,
1997-2007, 14 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 530, 536 (2012).
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thus condemned to die in solitary unless they agreed to become informants,
putting themselves and their families in danger of retribution in the process.8
Despite the formidable obstacles to organizing in these conditions,
thousands of California prisoners went on hunger strike in July 2011 to protest
the state of solitary confinement.9 The strike, led by SHU prisoners, garnered
national and international attention.10 Although state officials claimed that the
strike was gang inspired and led,11 a top official eventually met with four
strike leaders and agreed to minor reforms, including allowing prisoners to
send one picture of themselves home per year and providing a pull-up bar for
exercise in the recreation area.12 The official also promised to consider
procedural reforms regarding SHU placement and retention.13 As a result, the
prisoners ended the strike.14 Despite the prisoner hunger strikes placing the
national spotlight on California’s draconian prison policies, they achieved only
minimal success.15 Todd Ashker, one of the four leaders of the strike, wrote to
the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) asking us to file a class-action
lawsuit challenging California’s use of indeterminate solitary confinement.16
We agreed to do so. The CCR took the prisoners’ case because the prisoners
represented a powerful grassroots movement challenging a torturous policy of
prolonged solitary confinement. Moreover, the prisoners’ struggle had

8. See id.; Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 227 (2005) (discussing the dangers of

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15.
16.

informing). Many SHU prisoners had indeterminate sentences, meaning that they
theoretically could have been paroled from prison after a certain number of years. But
California had an unwritten—though in practice virtually absolute—rule that no
prisoner housed in the SHU could ever get parole. See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 14-23, 87-90. Practically, only those prisoners with
determinate sentences could get out of the SHU after serving their full time,
whereupon they would be released from years of isolation straight into the outside
world. Id.
Ian Lovett, Hunger Strike by Inmates is Latest Challenge to California’s Prison System, N.Y.
TIMES (July 7, 2011), https://perma.cc/VV3K-FB5X.
See, e.g., id. (drawing attention to the movement via an article in a major international
news publication).
Id.
REITER, supra note 1, at 196.
Id.; Letter from Robert A. Barton, Inspector Gen., California Off. of the Inspector Gen.,
to California Sen. Darrell Steinberg 2 (Oct. 17, 2011), https://perma.cc/4KHH-YAR7.
REITER, supra note 1, at 196. A second strike in September 2011 ended similarly. See
Robert J. Lopez, State Prison Officials Vow to Crack Down on Inmate Hunger Strikes, L.A.
TIMES (Sept. 29, 2011, 8:15 PM), https://perma.cc/4P34-5TBU; Inmates End Hunger Strike
at Pelican Bay, Prison Advocates Rally, CBS SF BAY AREA (Oct. 14, 2011, 4:15 PM),
https://perma.cc/GE8M-LS38.
See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 160-163.
At that time, I was the president of the CCR.
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national implications: At the time, reports indicated that approximately 80,000
prisoners in the United States were in solitary confinement.17
The CCR’s representation of these prisoners is an example of “movement
lawyering,” in which attorneys represent sociopolitical movements using a
multifaceted strategy that treats impact litigation as just one aspect of a
broader activist campaign.18 Unlike most of the impact litigation described in
academic literature or practiced by progressive and class-action litigators,19
however, the Pelican Bay attorneys actively involved the plaintiffs in all
aspects of the suit: choosing class representatives, deciding on claims to
present, making important tactical decisions, negotiating and ratifying a
settlement agreement, and monitoring the settlement decree. The prisoners’
activism, as well as their legal and practical knowledge gained from years of
challenging solitary confinement, called for litigating this class-action suit in a
different manner than the typical impact-lawyering approach. I term the
resulting framework participatory litigation to denote that one central aim of
the case was empowering the plaintiffs to play an important role in directing
the litigation itself.
Participatory litigation challenges the practices and ethical understandings
of class-action and impact litigators. It involves litigators providing plaintiffs
with an authentic, nonmediated voice in presenting their claims to defendants,
judges, and the public. Movement activists work closely with participatory
lawyers in deciding on the named plaintiffs and the legal claims they raise. In
contrast to the traditional attorney–client relationship, participatory litigation
involves class members and named plaintiffs in tactical and strategic legal
decisionmaking. Most importantly, participatory class-action litigation
17. See COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AM.’S PRISONS, VERA INST. OF JUST., CONFRONTING

CONFINEMENT 52 (2006); see also ASS’N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS & ARTHUR LITMAN PUB.
INT. PROGRAM AT YALE L. SCH., TIME-IN-CELL: THE ASCA–LIMAN 2014 NATIONAL
SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON, at ii (2015) [hereinafter ASCA–
LITMAN SURVEY] (estimating that “80,000 to 100,000 people were, in 2014, in
segregation”).
18. See Scott L. Cummings, Movement Lawyering, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1645, 1646-54; Susan D.
Carle & Scott L. Cummings, A Reflection on the Ethics of Movement Lawyering, 31 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 447, 452-59 (2018); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Symposium Introduction, 47
HOFSTRA L. REV 1, 1-2 (2018); see also Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind:
Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2743-49
(2014); Deborah N. Archer, Political Lawyering for the 21st Century, 96 DENV. L. REV. 399,
401-02, 417 (2019).
19. For example, David Fathi, the director of the National Prison Project at the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and an experienced class-action prison litigator,
recognizes that the participatory-litigation framework described in this Article is quite
unusual given his experience. Telephone Interview with David C. Fathi, Dir., ACLU
Nat’l Prison Project (Feb. 2, 2021). My own observations, as well as conversations with
experienced impact litigators such as David Rudovsky, Bill Quigley, Rachel Meeropol,
and Sam Miller, confirm Fathi’s conclusion.
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encourages collective, communal decisionmaking on matters such as
settlement negotiations and ratification while also providing a role for
plaintiffs in collectively monitoring compliance.
Participatory litigation has three main elements that require a
reorientation of traditional class-action and impact lawyering seeking
structural change. The first element involves transforming the lawyer–client
relationship by incorporating insights from rebellious,20 collaborative,21
client-centered,22 and democratic23 lawyering into impact, test-case, and classaction litigation. Even in complex litigation, lawyers and clients should have
an equal dialogic relationship, with each bringing skills and insights to their
mutual struggle. Probably the best description of this lawyering model is what
Lucie White termed a “third-dimensional practice of law,” derived from Paulo
Freire’s work and feminist understandings of “consciousness raising,” which
posits the attorney with professional skills engaging in a “mutual learning
practice” with oppressed communities.24 An important aspect of creating a
more egalitarian society is breaking down the hierarchy of expertise, in which
the skills of professionals such as lawyers dominate and deny the expertise of
the people those professionals seek to aid. Impact litigators can bring
invaluable expertise in strategy, tactics, and legal theory to a lawsuit, but
achieving long-lasting structural change and utilizing the litigation to further
the goal of transforming society requires that the lawyers learn from and
accept the expertise of their clients. Those clients, class members, and
movement leaders may have insights and expertise gleaned from their
understanding of the oppression they experience that class-action litigators all
too often ignore. The lawyers who introduced me to participatory litigation,
which they termed “accompaniment,” described it as “two experts . . . exploring
the way forward together.”25
Second, by actively involving clients in the litigation, participatory
litigation centers clients’ voices. While impact litigation has resulted in many
20. See GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE

LAW PRACTICE 37-38 (1992) (describing rebellious lawyering).
21. See Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 427, 440-

41 (2000) (describing collaborative lawyering).
22. See DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN & SUSAN C. PRICE, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A

CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH, at xxi (1991) (describing client-centered lawyering).
23. See Sameer M. Ashar, Essay, Deep Critique and Democratic Lawyering in Clinical Practice,

104 CALIF. L. REV. 201, 221 (2016) (describing democratic lawyering).
24. Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power,
1988 WIS. L. REV. 699, 760-62.
25. STAUGHTON LYND, ACCOMPANYING: PATHWAYS TO SOCIAL CHANGE 4 (2013); see also
ALICE LYND & STAUGHTON LYND, STEPPING STONES: MEMOIR OF A LIFE TOGETHER 87, 93
(2009) (describing the concept of two experts—one legal and one nonlegal—combining
their expertise).
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sweeping changes, it “is rarely designed to give voice to the clients’ own
perceptions of their needs.”26 Accordingly, impact litigators often make little
or no effort to involve their clients in the litigation process.27 In class-action
lawsuits, plaintiffs are often excluded from any role, with courts even allowing
lawyers to settle claims despite the opposition of most named plaintiffs or class
members.28 Indeed, an underlying question pervading class-action doctrine is
how to make lawyers accountable to the class they purport to represent,
especially when lawyers litigate or settle the case based on their own interests
and views of what is best without consulting with or adequately representing
the class.29 A participatory framework seeks to radically alter that dynamic
and use the class action to empower clients through their active, collective
participation in the lawsuit.
Finally, participatory litigation attempts to integrate substantive legal
reforms with democratic changes to challenged institutions. This difficult-toachieve goal differs from due process, thought of as an individual’s right to be
heard,30 because its focus is on group rights. Participatory litigation furthers
participatory democracy by demanding a communal or collective right to
participate in institutional decisionmaking.31 As some have noted, such
demands in public-law litigation promote an “empowered democracy” by
fostering the “citizen’s interest in breaking open the large-scale organizations
or the extended areas of social practice” that “sustain insulated hierarchies of
power and advantage.”32
26. Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to

Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535, 545 n.45 (1987-1988).
27. See, e.g., id. at 541, 545.
28. Stephen Ellmann, Client -Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective

29.

30.

31.

32.

Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers’ Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 1103, 1119
(1992).
John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 370-72 (2000); see also Ellmann, supra
note 28, at 1119-20. Cases such as Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor draw this question
into sharp relief. See 521 U.S. 591, 607-08, 625-28 (1997); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While
the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1048
(1995) (critiquing the lawyers who settled the case based on their own interests rather
than the interests of the class they purported to represent); see also id. at 1137-41
(recounting how a key named plaintiff was unaware of virtually anything involving
the case, including the settlement).
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (“For more than a century the central meaning
of procedural due process has been clear: ‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are
entitled to be heard . . . .’ ” (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1864))).
See generally Staughton Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1417, 1422-35 (1984)
(defining communal rights and providing examples, including the right to strike and
certain First Amendment protections).
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1055-56 (2004) (quoting ROBERTO MANGABEIRA
footnote continued on next page
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The demand for institutional participation could be seen as minimally
reformist or perhaps even co-optive, but in many contexts it presents a radical
challenge to institutions constructed on fundamentally undemocratic
premises. For example, demanding collective prisoner participation in prison
governance is so inconsistent with the hierarchical nature of American prisons
that it can prefigure an alternative to incarceration: abolitionism.33 While
litigation is not a plausible vehicle for fulfilling abolitionist goals such as
dismantling oppressive, hierarchical institutions, a participatory demand
requiring some empowerment of and dialogue with the oppressed group can
provide the seeds of a different, more egalitarian model of social relations.34
Participatory demands are thus potentially transformative in imagining a
radically different social order.35
The academic literature on movement lawyering—or “law and
organizing,” a term given to a form of movement lawyering which focuses on
combining legal work with community organizing36—contains a wealth of
rich, detailed, and nuanced narratives of social-justice campaigns in which
lawyers played an active role.37 Yet surprisingly, these narratives contain little

33.

34.

35.
36.
37.

UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF
RADICAL DEMOCRACY 530 (1987)).
The inconsistency was demonstrated in our case by prison officials’ bitter opposition
to even the most minimal democratic participation, even more so than their
opposition to substantive Eighth Amendment reforms. For an example of abolitionism
in action, see Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV.
1613, 1621-23 (2019) (discussing activists’ desire to transform “the power structures and
immediate social relations that breed harm in the first instance” through abolitionist
techniques).
W.E.B. Du Bois and Angela Davis, who both developed the notion of “abolition
democracy,” viewed it as “a positive project [as opposed to a] merely a negative one.”
Mon Mohapatra & Rachel Foran, Abolitionists Want You to Imagine a Better World
Beyond the Ballot Box, HARPER’S BAZAAR (Nov. 11, 2020, 3:03 PM EST) (quoting Allegra
M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1162 (2015)),
https://perma.cc/986J-EXCY. Community empowerment and other forms of
grassroots participation and leadership are thus important to the abolitionistdemocracy framework. See, e.g., id.; McLeod, supra note 33, at 1622-23 (describing “local
social-change projects” that “begin to realize incrementally the sort of changed world
we would want to live in”).
See Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 426-34
(2018).
Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48
UCLA L. REV. 443, 447 (2001).
E.g., Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace
Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 443-50 (1995);
White, supra note 24, at 699-701; White, supra note 26, at 546-63; Julie A. Su, Making the
Invisible Visible: The Garment Industry’s Dirty Laundry, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 405,
406-13, 417 (1998); Veryl Pow, Comment, Rebellious Social Movement Lawyering Against
Traffic Court Debt, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1770, 1787-801 (2017); Sameer M. Ashar, Public
footnote continued on next page
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detail about client participation in major litigation. They focus instead on how
attorneys and litigation can aid client participation outside of the courtroom:
namely, in the streets, in the legislature, and in the press.38 These movement
narratives set forth a division of labor to counteract the potential for lawyer
dominance or subordination of clients: The lawyer focuses on litigation and
plays a supportive role in the organizing efforts that surround the case.39 Scott
Cummings, one of the most prominent and distinguished movement
lawyering scholars, discounts movement participation in the litigation:
[D]iscussions of movement lawyering place less emphasis on lawyer-enabled
participation and more emphasis on traditional conceptions of role specialization
and lawyer expertise. Lawyers promote participation by using their legal
expertise to support movement organizations, which are the vehicles through
which participation occurs. At bottom, movement lawyering places more of an
emphasis on building power than achieving participation as such—although the
two are linked.40

In contrast, this Article proposes envisioning participation as a
fundamental component of class-action, impact, and movement litigation.
Participation affirms the plaintiffs’ dignity and humanity, which is often
systematically and brutally denied to them by institutions or officials.41
Moreover, transformation of society requires challenging hierarchical
relationships. This can be brought about with a new framework where both
the professional and the layperson develop a mutual respect in their respective
expertise and collaborate in their joint enterprise. Reimagining and
reconfiguring the relationship between the professional and the
nonprofessional is important in a wide range of endeavors, whether it be
legislative policymaking, individual litigation, public speaking, humanitarian
aid, or impact litigation.

38.
39.

40.
41.

Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1879, 1879-80 (2007); Scott L.
Cummings, Litigation at Work: Defending Day Labor in Los Angeles, 58 UCLA L. REV.
1617, 1618-21 (2011); Guinier & Torres, supra note 18, at 2777-81.
See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 37, at 1648-50 (streets); White, supra note 26, at 547-50
(legislature); Ashar, supra note 37, at 1922 (press).
See, e.g., Ashar, supra note 37, at 1889, 1910-11, 1913 (describing a division of labor
where organizers and workers defined overall goals and engaged in a political
campaign while lawyers tended to the litigation); White, supra note 26, at 545-46
(noting that, although the poor may feel irrelevant in welfare litigation, “a lawsuit
might be an occasion for poor people to join together, outside of the formal boundaries
of the litigation, in spaces that are parallel to it”).
Cummings, supra note 18, at 1727.
For an excellent discussion of the dignifying potential of litigation, see Angela M. Gius,
Dignifying Participation, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 45, 70-73 (2018). See also
Martha Minow, Lawyering for Human Dignity, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 143,
155 (2002) (“Often, empowering individuals to advocate for themselves recognizes and
honors their own dignity.”).
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Perhaps more importantly, successful impact litigation often requires
engaged participation by activist plaintiffs who understand oppressive
structures better than their lawyers. Such engagement between lawyers and
plaintiffs enhances the mutual trust and understanding that aids successful
lawsuits. The involvement of class members, community groups, and named
representatives is particularly crucial in constructing a settlement agreement
to change harmful practices.42 It is also vital in monitoring the resulting decree
to ensure its long-term implementation.43
This Article explores participatory litigation through the lens of a major
class-action case which has now spanned about ten years. It reflects on the
efforts of the legal team, prisoners, and prisoners’ family members to litigate
Ashker v. Governor of California 44 in a participatory fashion, and it grapples
with obstacles we faced, mistakes the plaintiffs and their attorneys made, and
the successes and failures of our endeavor.45 Part I of the Article sets forth the
history of progressive scholars’ and lawyers’ attempts to address the
contradictions and limitations of the law-reform model. Part II utilizes the
Pelican Bay narrative to explore the possibilities of plaintiff participation in
class-action lawsuits, particularly those suits seeking injunctive relief. I use the
narrative form to explicate law and theory from the bottom up.46
Transformative social change is aided by grounding theory “in experience
rather than proceeding primarily from idealized and abstract premises with
little attention to how those ideals are translated into actual practices.”47 Every
case is different: The plaintiffs here were more engaged and legally
knowledgeable than most others, but they were limited by the channels of
communication available to them as prisoners. But the Pelican Bay narrative
suggests that possibilities for plaintiff participation in class-action or other
group litigation are not as minimal as commonly assumed. Accordingly, these
42. See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Lawyers and the Practice of Workplace Equity, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 277,

43.
44.
45.

46.

47.

301-02 (demonstrating the important role that plaintiffs can play in constructing an
adequate settlement).
See Sabel & Simon, supra note 32, at 1070-71.
Ashker v. Governor of California, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., https://perma.cc/7J25-N357 (last
updated Apr. 9, 2021); see also supra text accompanying note 16.
On the critical importance of reflection for movement lawyers, see William P.
Quigley, Letter to a Law Student Interested in Social Justice, 1 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 7, 2324 (2007).
See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 971, 975 (1991);
Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2411, 2413-15 (1989); Amna A. Akbar, Sameer M. Ashar & Jocelyn Simonson,
Movement Law, 73 STAN. L. REV. 821, 878 (2021) (“[M]ovement narratives work
simultaneously to denaturalize the status quo and to help make another world more
possible.”).
McLeod, supra note 33, at 1617.
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possibilities should be more thoroughly explored.48 What prevents impact
litigators from adopting a more participatory framework is not that doing so is
impossible or even difficult, but rather that the usual methods of conducting
impact litigation do not motivate attorneys to think about participation.49
Finally, Part III distills lessons from the Pelican Bay litigation for society’s
conceptions of representation, expertise, and democracy. Political representation
and group legal representation are in some respects analogous, and both are
necessary in a large, complex society. The theory of both forms of
representation oscillates between a mandate form of representation, where the
representative directly supports her constituents’ views; an interest form of
representation, where the representative is presumed to have the same
interests as those she represents; and an accountability form of representation,
where constituents or clients delegate broad discretion to the representative
subject to periodic voting or another mechanism for removal.50 Participatory
litigation, in contrast to the more traditional principal–agent theory of
representation,51 requires collaborative, collective, and consensus-building
interactions between the representative and those she represents. In this
model, the representative and the client teach and learn from one another.
I.

Lessons from the Past: The Critique of Class-Action Impact
Litigation
A. The Critique of Liberal Legalism

The major law-reform and impact litigation that dominated the Warren
and early Burger Courts in the 1950s through the 1970s achieved significant
judicial victories,52 but was nevertheless subjected to increasing criticism.53
48. Cf. Ann Southworth, Collective Representation for the Disadvantaged: Variations in

49.
50.
51.

52.
53.

Problems of Accountability, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2449, 2457, 2461 (1999) (suggesting that,
empirically, “there is nothing inherent in collective projects to give lawyers excessive
power in their relationships with clients”).
Telephone Interview with David Fathi, supra note 19.
See generally HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967)
(describing different theories of representation).
Under the traditional principal–agent theory, a client or constituency accords broad
discretion to a representative, and that representative is subject to client control and
accountability. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006).
See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1979).
See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE
56-74 (1987); Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness
and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 946-48 (2007) (describing critiques of
the use of legal avenues to affect social and political change).
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Law-reform litigation was criticized as ineffective and a “hollow hope” in
achieving lasting, transformative change, deluding people into relying on the
law and the courts to reform society.54 Such litigation was also deemed
hierarchical, elitist, and undemocratic in promoting the lawyer as the agent of
change while relegating mass activism to a subordinate role.55 Ella Baker, an
influential civil rights activist, reportedly critiqued the NAACP and reasoned
that “[t]he legal strategy ‘had to be’ directed by lawyers and other professionals,
leaving most of the huge mass base . . . little meaningful role in the
development of policy and program except raising funds and cheering the
victories as they came.”56 A third, related argument claimed that lawyers
litigating impact cases were disconnected from, uninterested in, and sometimes
even opposed to their clients’ views, as illustrated by Derrick Bell’s influential
critique of the NAACP’s school-desegregation lawyering.57 These critiques all
challenged the legal-liberalist model, in which courts and lawyers served as the
engines of social change.58
The predominant alternative espoused by critics of legal liberalism was to
eliminate or at least de-emphasize litigation, particularly impact litigation, as a
strategy for social change. For these critics, litigation should be “avoided
whenever possible,” as it tends to “reinforce the client’s experience of
powerlessness.”59 As Derrick Bell once mused, “real progress [in civil rights]
can come only through tactics other than litigation.”60 While these critiques
never totally rejected litigation, they emphasized lawyers using nonlitigation
skills to aid movements seeking social change.61

54. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL

CHANGE? 336-43 (1991).
55. See Thomas Hilbink, The Profession, the Grassroots and the Elite: Cause Lawyering for Civil

56.
57.

58.
59.
60.
61.

Rights and Freedom in the Direct Action Era, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
60, 63-65 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006).
CHARLES M. PAYNE, I’VE GOT THE LIGHT OF FREEDOM: THE ORGANIZING TRADITION AND
THE MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM STRUGGLE 79, 87 (1995).
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 482-87 (1976); see also, e.g., White, supra
note 26, at 535-36 (“The individuals who served as named plaintiffs in these [welfare]
lawsuits sometimes had little contact with their lawyers or involvement in the lawsuit
after the complaint was filed and their depositions [were] recorded.”).
See Cummings, supra note 18, at 1650.
See Richard L. Abel, Lawyers and the Power to Change, 7 LAW & POL’Y 5, 9 (1985).
Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term—Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99
HARV. L. REV. 4, 24 (1985).
See Cummings, supra note 18, at 1704.
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In much of the alternative-model literature, impact litigation was
eschewed or ignored as inconsistent with new lawyering.62 To one scholar, the
goals of impact litigation are “typically predetermined by the lawyers’ own
policy analyses,” and “[c]lients rarely deliberate with the lawyers, as equals, in
formulating these goals, and [thus] clients’ personal feelings of injury are
seldom the primary data that counsel respond to.”63 Impact litigation was
viewed as an unlikely setting for mobilizing or involving clients in the
litigation or applying collaborative-lawyering principles.64
Accordingly, the alternative models of lawyering typically promoted skills
such as negotiating, organizing, and strategizing on political issues.65 Major
case studies of these models of lawyering—such as Lucie White’s study of a
South African village’s fight against removal and Jennifer Gordon’s article on
workers’ centers—contained richly detailed narratives and analyses of political
battles in which lawyers played a prominent role.66 Impact litigation, however,
was virtually absent from these studies.
Moreover, this new lawyering placed crucial importance on creating a
different attorney–client relationship than typical of impact litigators. The
collaborative “third-dimensional” model, for example, emphasized the
attorney’s task of learning from and understanding the client holistically, not
just as a subject with legal problems.67 Alternative models viewed clients as
people, not causes,68 with the lawyer and the client engaged in a mutual
62. Bill Quigley, one of the outstanding movement lawyers of the past few decades, states

63.
64.
65.

66.
67.
68.

that movement lawyers should “work for and with organizations, not issues: This is
not impact litigation or law reform.” Bill Quigley, 20 Tools for Movement Lawyering
1 (n.d.) (capitalization altered), https://perma.cc/57UU-LKVW; see also, e.g., Michael
Grinthal, Power with: Practice Models for Social Justice Lawyering, 15 U. PA. J.L. & SOC.
CHANGE 25, 33 (2011) (explaining public-interest lawyers’ “growing dissatisfaction with
impact litigation”); Archer, supra note 18, at 417-18 (“What began as a tactical
deemphasis on litigation evolved into a philosophical bias against litigation as a social
justice advocacy tool.”); Martha L. Gómez, The Culture of Non-profit Impact Litigation, 23
CLINICAL L. REV. 635, 644 (2017) (calling for a transformation of the “dysfunctional
culture . . . within non-profit impact litigation”).
White, supra note 26, at 545 n.45.
Id. at 542-45.
See, e.g., LÓPEZ, supra note 20, at 2-3; White, supra note 24, at 742, 763-64; Cummings &
Eagly, supra note 36, at 447-50. But see Ann Southworth, Taking the Lawyer Out of
Progressive Lawyering, 46 STAN. L. REV. 213, 215, 221-22 (1993) (reviewing LÓPEZ, supra
note 20).
White, supra note 24, at 719-38; Gordon, supra note 37, at 437-45.
See White, supra note 24, at 762-64.
See ALAN K. CHEN & SCOTT L. CUMMINGS, PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING: A
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 289-90 (2013). By contrast, Melvin Wulf, the former
director of the ACLU, is quoted as having stated that “[o]ur real client is the Bill of
Rights”—reflecting a view that his clients were causes, not people. See Comment, The
New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069, 1092 (1970).
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learning process. One of the key goals was the transformation of the attorney–
client relationship from one of domination and subordination of the client to
one of mutual empowerment, with the creation of a “nonhierarchical
community.”69
B. Movement Lawyering
Progressive scholars have recently displayed a renewed interest in impact
litigation under the banner of movement lawyering. Several factors account
for this trend. First, the lawyering models described above were criticized for
abandoning structural change for a postmodernist vision of micropolitics
focused on transforming relationships.70 Second, scholars have continued to
recognize that litigation’s main achievement may not be courtroom victory,
but rather indirect results such as educating the public, augmenting leverage,
or mobilizing political action.71 Relatedly, recent social movements have
initiated impact litigation as part of a multifaceted approach along with
organizing, public education, lobbying, and direct action.72
Movement lawyering is premised on the recognition that (1) fundamental
and lasting societal changes stem primarily from grassroots movements; and
(2) landmark judicial decisions generally reflect those societal changes.
Movement law has five key attributes. First, movement lawyers represent
grassroots movements and organizations fighting injustice and seeking
transformational change. Second, campaigns involve not only (or even
primarily) litigation but also a multiplicity of political and organizing tactics.
Third, the likelihood of judicial victory is not dispositive in determining
whether movement lawyers institute litigation. Instead, the touchstone is
whether the case will aid the movement’s organizing. Fourth, litigation is used
to promote a radical critique of the legal norms perpetuating injustice (even

69. See William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469, 485-86

(1984).
70. Cummings, supra note 18, at 1657; Eduardo R.C. Capulong, Client Activism in Progressive

Lawyering Theory, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 109, 175-177 (2009); see Joel F. Handler,
Presidential Address, Postmodernism, Protest, and the New Social Movements, 26 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 697, 724 (1992).
71. MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF
LEGAL MOBILIZATION 10 (1994); JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL
SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 209-10 (1978); Jules Lobel,
Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L. REV. 477, 486 (2004); White, supra note 26, at
563-64; Ben Depoorter, Essay, The Upside of Losing, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 817, 820 (2013).
72. DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO MAKE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-6 (2016) (describing how major constitutional campaigns on
same-sex marriage, gun rights, and Guantanamo Bay were all undertaken with a
multifaceted approach).
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while pursuing limited reforms). Fifth, attorneys encourage grassroots
participation in the movement’s legal and political struggles.73
Recent scholarship has focused on two key features of movement
lawyering that distinguish it from the impact-litigation campaigns of the 1960s
and 1970s.74 The first is the use of an “integrated advocacy approach, in which
litigation plays an important (though not central) role.”75 In this view,
traditional impact litigators erred by adopting a “litigation-centric social
change” model over a multilayered approach combining numerous forms of
advocacy.76
Second, movement lawyering scholarship relies on the attorney’s
“accountability” to the movement to overcome the hierarchy present in the
traditional attorney–client relationship.77 A “participatory, power-sharing
process within the lawyer/client relationship” is achieved through the
representation of strong activist organizations such as the Montgomery
Improvement Association, which led the 1955 Montgomery bus boycott and
“was a constituency of accountability, capable of holding lawyers . . . to the
discipline of shared power.”78
While the idea of accountability aligning movement lawyers with their
constituency’s interests is important, it focuses on the negative goal of
checking attorney-driven litigation rather than the affirmative enterprise of
73. These basic principles are based on my long experience with the CCR, as well as the

74.
75.

76.

77.

78.

political and academic literature on movement lawyering. E.g., Quigley, supra note 62
(describing twenty principles and tools for movement lawyering); How We Work, CTR.
FOR CONST. RTS., https://perma.cc/HX4C-LF2G (last updated May 20, 2015);
Cummings, supra note 18, at 1658-60 (setting forth two key features associated with
movement lawyering); Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 1-4 (explaining that movement
lawyers use law to empower clients and advance social movements); JULES LOBEL,
SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY: LOST LEGAL BATTLES AND THE LONG ROAD TO JUSTICE IN
AMERICA 3-4 (2003) (noting that movement lawyers take cases even though “courtroom
success [is] highly improbable”); Purvi Shah, Rebuilding the Ethical Compass of Law, 47
HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 14 (2018); Michael Steven Smith, Foreword to MICHAEL RATNER,
MOVING THE BAR: MY LIFE AS A RADICAL LAWYER 1, 7 (2021) (describing Ratner’s four
basic principles of radical lawyering); see also Guinier & Torres, supra note 18, at 2753.
See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 18, at 1689-90.
Carle & Cummings, supra note 18, at 458; see also Archer, supra note 18, at 402 (arguing
for the “transformational potential of integrated advocacy—strategic litigation,
community organizing, direct action, media strategies, and interdisciplinary
collaboration proceeding together”).
See Guinier & Torres, supra note 18, at 2756 & n.49 (criticizing “the tendency of
litigation to migrate from tactics to strategic centrality” and “the failure of many cause
lawyers to formulate their strategy in conjunction with cycles of mobilization”).
See Cummings, supra note 18, at 1691-92; Carle & Cummings, supra note 18, at 458
(“Movement lawyers think of themselves as broadly accountable to social movements,
which are themselves represented by specific organizations and their leaders.”).
See Guinier & Torres, supra note 18, at 2753, 2777-80.
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movement participation in the litigation itself. Beyond aiding political
mobilization, litigation could provide an additional forum for empowering
mobilized constituencies. Participatory litigation not only offers greater
accountability but also challenges some basic conceptions of legal
representation, such as the canonical perspective that tactical litigation issues
are generally for the lawyer, not the client, to resolve.79
While class-action impact litigation can be hostile to grassroots
participation,80 a fundamental goal of movement lawyers should be to
transform the litigation process in addition to challenging normative legal
rules. Litigation can exclude poor people, but so too can extralegal arenas.81
The democratic goals of expanding participation in societal institutions and
reconceiving the role of professional expertise can apply with equal force to
class-action impact litigation.82
Scholars have generally assumed that class-action impact litigation cannot
be collaborative or participatory.83 Even recent movement lawyering
narratives involving significant lawsuits contain, at most, cursory discussions
of grassroots participation in the litigation process itself.84 The dearth of
scholarship around participatory-litigation efforts suggests a need for
empirical studies or narrative accounts to demonstrate the possibilities,
dilemmas, and theoretical insights of a participatory-litigation framework.
This Article aims to fill that gap.
C. Participatory Antecedents of the Pelican Bay Litigation
A participatory framework was successfully used in dramatic fashion in
major litigation efforts prior to the Pelican Bay lawsuit. In the civil rights
movement and the early women’s movement, lawyers such as Arthur Kinoy
79. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (Scope of

80.
81.
82.

83.
84.

Representation) (“In questions of means, the lawyer should assume responsibility for
technical and legal tactical issues . . . .”); see also Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical
Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 29
(1990) (“It was a tactical decision—not the kind of issue that clients were supposed to
decide.”).
See White, supra note 26, at 541-45.
See Lobel, supra note 53, at 970, 976-77 (“[T]he extralegal model has suffered from the
same drawbacks associated with legal cooptation.”).
See Ascanio Piomelli, The Democratic Roots of Collaborative Lawyering, 12 CLINICAL L.
REV. 541, 576-78 (2006) [hereinafter Piomelli, Democratic Roots]; Ascanio Piomelli, The
Challenge of Democratic Lawyering, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1383, 1402-05 (2009).
See, e.g., Mary Kay Kane, Essay, Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class
Action Lawyer, 66 TEX. L. REV. 385, 389 (1987); White, supra note 26, at 540-45.
See Su, supra note 37, at 408-13; Ashar, supra note 37, at 1910-16; Cummings, supra
note 37, at 1643-49.
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and Nancy Stearns used a participatory framework to litigate class-wide
issues.85
During the Mississippi Freedom Summer of 1964, Kinoy and other lawyers
involved large numbers of Black activists in their litigation.86 These lawyers
used similar participatory mechanisms when the Mississippi Freedom
Democratic Party (MFDP) asked them to challenge Mississippi’s all-white
congressional delegation resulting from Black disenfranchisement.87 The
lawyers assembled teams consisting of attorneys and organizers, and these
teams went into thirty-three Mississippi counties to conduct hearings
discussing the denial of voting rights to Blacks.88 The lawyer–organizer teams
took over 600 depositions; on “carefully selected occasions,” the teams used
federal subpoena power to “haul representatives of the power structure before
gatherings of community people, where they were forced to testify to specific
incidents of violence and intimidation and to the wholesale exclusion of Black
people from the registration and voting process.”89
In 1965, the teams submitted 600 pieces of evidence supporting the
challenge to Congress.90 Before hundreds of supporters, MFDP candidates and
their lawyers spoke to the House of Representatives, urging Congress to reject
the seating of the white congressmen chosen in an election that excluded Black
voters.91 Their challenge was rejected by the House, but 143 members of
Congress voted to support it.92
The four lawyers involved in the challenge joined to form a new national
legal organization supporting movement lawyering: the CCR.93 Early in the
CCR’s history, a group of lawyers at the Center helped launch pre-Roe
challenges to restrictive abortion laws in New York and Connecticut.94 In both
cases, the CCR and cooperating attorneys built on Kinoy’s participatory
initiatives in Mississippi. Working with women’s organizations in New York
and Connecticut, they initiated test cases in which the plaintiffs were not male
85. ARTHUR KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL: THE ODYSSEY OF A PEOPLE’S LAWYER 250-55 (1983);

86.
87.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Reva B. Siegel, Roe’s Roots: The Women’s Rights Claims That Engendered Roe, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 1875, 1885-94 (2010).
See KINOY, supra note 85, at 250-55.
See id. at 267-76, 280-82. See generally The 1965 Mississippi Congressional Challenge, C.R.
TEACHING, https://perma.cc/V8LS-VKZ7 (archived Oct. 2, 2021) (explaining the
challenge’s background and rationale).
KINOY, supra note 85, at 281.
Id.
The 1965 Mississippi Congressional Challenge, supra note 87.
KINOY, supra note 85, at 292-93.
Id. at 293-94.
Id. at 281.
Siegel, supra note 85, at 1885-94.
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doctors, but women affected by the laws themselves.95 And not just a few
women, either: Between the New York and Connecticut cases, over 2,000
women became named plaintiffs in these class-action lawsuits.96
The women’s organizations and CCR attorneys agreed to “use law as an
organizing device.”97 CCR attorney Nancy Stearns and organizers from the
New York Women’s Health Collective attended numerous meetings where
women were encouraged to talk about their experiences with the medical
profession on abortion and other health issues.98 At these meetings, Stearns
explained the lawsuit and recruited plaintiffs.
Stearns and her team of lawyers used the lawsuit to tell women’s stories.
They scheduled publicly attended depositions of women who had abortion
stories to narrate, and the New York Times and other media reported on these
narratives.99 At public hearings, women packed the court. Some brought
babies; others brought coat hangers.100
Stearns’s brief in Abramowicz v. Lefkowitz101 focused not on the rights of
doctors but on a woman’s right to self-determination and equal status, which it
argued was at the heart of a woman’s abortion decision.102 Moreover, as Reva
Siegel noted, “the suit employed new feminist modes of argument,” as “[t]he
brief . . . opened by recounting stories contained in the depositions of fourteen
witnesses who had testified” about the abortion laws’ harsh effects upon
women.103 In response to mass activism and litigation, the New York State
Legislature legalized abortion until the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy,
which mooted the lawsuit.104
In Connecticut, a group of women met to discuss abortion rights and
decided that a lawsuit could be a “wonderful organizing vehicle . . . to further

95. Id. at 1185-87; SUSAN BROWNMILLER, IN OUR TIME: MEMOIR OF A REVOLUTION 110-11

(1999).
96. Siegel, supra note 85, at 1885, 1894.
97. Telephone Interview with Nancy Stearns, Former Att’y, Ctr. for Const. Rts. (Nov. 17,

2010).
98. Nancy Stearns, Commentary, Roe v. Wade: Our Struggle Continues, 4 BERKELEY

WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 3 (1988-1989).
See BROWNMILLER, supra note 95, at 112.
Stearns, supra note 98, at 3.
Hall v. Lefkowitz (Abramowicz v. Lefkowitz), 305 F. Supp. 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Siegel, supra note 85, at 1885, 1891 n.72; see Janice Goodman, Rhonda Copelon
Schoenbrod & Nancy Stearns, Doe and Roe: Where Do We Go from Here?, WOMEN’S RTS.
L. REP., Spring 1973, at 20, 22, 28.
103. Siegel, supra note 85, at 1885.
104. Id. at 1886.
99.
100.
101.
102.
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the goals of the women’s movement overall.”105 These women enlisted several
lawyers, including Nancy Stearns. The organizers published a pamphlet,
created an organization named “Women versus Connecticut,” and held
meetings throughout the state to recruit plaintiffs.106 In a clear departure from
most class-action suits with a select few named plaintiffs, the group recruited
around 800 women in that capacity.107
In both the New York and Connecticut lawsuits, organizers and lawyers
challenged the notion that expert testimony—either of doctors or of social
scientists—would be decisive.108 Rather than rely on such testimony (which
would come primarily from men), they wanted women’s personal experiences
with abortion and pregnancy to serve as the primary evidence in the case. In
other words, litigators wanted “to have women testify, [as] women [and] as
experts.”109
Moreover, the cases focused on women speaking about abortion laws’
effects on their lives rather than emphasizing the constitutional rights
involved. At a Connecticut plaintiffs’ meeting in April 1971, Stearns argued
that what was needed was a “flesh and blood” presentation of the issues to the
judges.110 She recognized that “the only way we had a shot of winning in the
way we wanted to win, was if we could educate judges about what the real
impact was on women’s lives.”111
Many judges were resistant to women testifying about the impact of
abortion laws on their lives. In the CCR’s New York case, the court ruled that
all testimony would be conducted through depositions, where the judges
would not actually be present to hear the women testify.112 In Connecticut,
however, the three-judge panel heard the testimony of the female plaintiffs,
who explained how back-alley abortions or unwanted children disrupted and
harmed their lives.113 The court’s opinion in Abele v. Markle striking down
105. Amy Kesselman, Women Versus Connecticut: Conducting a Statewide Hearing on Abortion,

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

in ABORTION WARS: A HALF CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, 1950-2000, at 42, 45-46 (Rickie
Solinger ed., 1998) (quoting the author’s interview with Betsy Gilbertson).
Id. at 48-52. The recruitment process afforded an “opportunity to stimulate discussion
among women about reproductive freedom.” Id. at 48.
Id. at 52.
JENNIFER NELSON, WOMEN OF COLOR AND THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS MOVEMENT 4043 (2003); see infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
NELSON, supra note 108, at 42 (quoting DIANE SCHULDER & FLORYNCE KENNEDY,
ABORTION RAP 4 (1971)).
Telephone Interview with Nancy Stearns, supra note 97; see also Kesselman, supra
note 105, at 52-53.
Telephone Interview with Nancy Stearns, supra note 97.
Id.
Id.
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Connecticut’s abortion ban suggested that the women’s testimony had an
impact.114
Several class-action claims involving prisoners’ rights were also litigated
using a participatory framework prior to the Pelican Bay litigation. Perhaps
the most dramatic was a class-action suit by Michigan prisoners challenging
various conditions of their confinement. The prisoner-plaintiffs at first
represented themselves, and they eventually served as pro se lawyers acting
under the supervision of a Michigan Prison Legal Services attorney.115 In that
capacity, the plaintiff-lawyers conducted examination and cross-examination
of witnesses in the courtroom.116 After fifteen years of litigation the case was
settled, with the Michigan Department of Corrections agreeing, among other
things, to revise their administrative segregation policies.117
My first real introduction to participatory lawyering came in a classaction suit challenging the placement and retention of prisoners in Ohio’s new
super-maximum security prison (supermax). Alice and Staughton Lynd led the
litigation effort, and they recruited fourteen diverse plaintiffs to represent a
class of approximately 400 prisoners held in solitary confinement. Similar to
the abortion-rights organizers and attorneys, the Lynds relied primarily on
named-plaintiff testimony regarding conditions of confinement and the
process by which prisoners were placed and held in the supermax. During the
trial, two named plaintiffs sat at their counsel’s table (pursuant to court order)
to consult with lawyers on strategy and tactics. We had no high-powered
experts, while the state had recruited three prominent experts to testify.118
The most dramatic incidence of participatory lawyering occurred after
trial, when Judge Gwin suggested mediation before another judge. That
mediation resulted in a proposed settlement, which was then submitted to a
collective meeting of all the plaintiffs. With the plaintiffs locked in cells in a
semicircle, and only their faces visible through narrow slots of solid steel
114. See 342 F. Supp. 800, 801-02 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated, 410 U.S. 951 (1973).
115. Cain v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 548 N.W.2d 210, 232 (Mich. 1996) (instructing the lower

court to consider the appointment of a special counsel to represent the class of male
prisoner-plaintiffs “who have thus far proceeded in propria persona”); TERRY ALLEN
KUPERS, SOLITARY: THE INSIDE STORY OF SUPERMAX ISOLATION AND HOW WE CAN
ABOLISH IT 179-80 (2017) (describing the plaintiffs acting as lawyers under the
supervision of a Prison Legal Services attorney).
116. See KUPERS, supra note 115, at 179-80. Kupers, who was a witness in the case and was
examined by prisoner-plaintiff Raymond Charles Whalen, stated that Whalen “was
one of the most conscientious, creative, and competent attorneys I have ever worked
with, even though he had no law degree.” Id. at 179.
117. John E. Dannenberg, Acrimonious Michigan Prisoners’ Rights Suit Settled After 15 Years,
PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Oct. 2004), https://perma.cc/3BQ5-4MVV.
118. All of these facts are from my own experience as counsel for plaintiffs in Austin v.
Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
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doors, the plaintiffs and their lawyers discussed the settlement offer for several
hours. After much discussion where the lawyers expressed no opinion, the
plaintiffs voted unanimously to reject the settlement. The plaintiffs recognized
that while the settlement might help them individually get out of the
supermax, it would not resolve the problems for others going forward. To
close the meeting, Alice and Staughton Lynd, veterans of the civil rights
movement, led the prisoners and lawyers in singing “We Shall Overcome.”
A month later, Judge Gwin ruled that the prisoners had a protected liberty
interest in avoiding supermax confinement and that the procedures Ohio had
used to place them in confinement violated due process.119 That ruling was
affirmed by the Sixth Circuit, and the Supreme Court agreed that the prisoners
had a protected liberty interest.120 The Court, however, upheld Ohio’s newly
enacted reform procedures as constitutionally permissible.121
The CCR lawyers who represented the California prisoners could thus
draw upon a history of participatory collective litigation. We grounded
ourselves in that history, yet we sought to deepen and expand the practice and
meaning of plaintiff class-action participation.
II. A Participatory Class Action: Challenging Prolonged Solitary
Confinement in California
A. The California Prison Hunger Strikes of 2011: Launching a Movement
Movement lawyers represent a movement, not merely a class,122 and the
California prisoner hunger strikes of July and September 2011 launched a
remarkable movement.123 Prisoners from different ethnic and racial
backgrounds—who often had violent histories and had engaged in violence
against each other for years—were able to come together. Moreover, the
prisoners’ ability to attract national and international attention and frame
their struggle in the context of global human rights presented a powerful,
unique, and compelling narrative for the resulting litigation.
First, the strikes represented an incredible organizing feat by prisoners
confined in social isolation. Prisoners in solitary confinement develop a
119. Austin, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 754. Judge Gwin relied in part on the prisoners’ testimony. See

id. at 741.
120. Austin v. Wilkinson, 372 F.3d 346, 349 (6th Cir. 2004), aff ’d in part and rev’d in part, 545

U.S. 209 (2005); Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224, 230 (2005).
121. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 218, 230.
122. See, e.g., Guinier & Torres, supra note 18, at 2782 (“In the Montgomery Bus Boycott, the

lawyers represented a movement, not a class.”).
123. For a summary of the hunger strikes, see notes 9-14 and the accompanying text above.
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multitude of individual forms of resistance: refusing mental health treatment,
teaching themselves new skills to maintain a sense of identity, learning about
the law, and filing administrative grievances and lawsuits.124 Collective
resistance to supermax confinement, however, is naturally hard to organize.
Indeed, the rise of solitary confinement and the use of supermaxes such as
Pelican Bay were reactions by prison officials to the collective organizing of
prisoners in the 1960s and 1970s.125 The Pelican Bay hunger strikers broke
through the isolation from one another and from the world, and their actions
coincided with a renewal of prisoner hunger strikes throughout the country
and around the globe.126 As one leading commentator noted, the 2011 Pelican
Bay hunger strike “was more productive and organized than any seen in the
prior twenty years of the United States’ experiment with supermax
confinement.”127
Second, the hunger strikes presented a powerful counternarrative to the
prison officials’ story: that the prisoners were less than human, the worst of the
worst, the most dangerous and violent people in their system. Inconsistent
with that narrative, thousands of prisoners, many of whom had been convicted
of violent crimes, engaged in nonviolent collective protest to challenge
dehumanizing and torturous conditions.
These prisoner strikes were a collective form of resistance demanding
recognition of humanity128 and the creation of normative law.129 As Robert
Cover put it:
[T]he normative world-building which constitutes “Law” is never just a mental or
spiritual act. A legal world is built only to the extent that there are commitments
that place bodies on the line. The torture of the martyr . . . reminds us that the
interpretive commitments of officials are realized, indeed, in the flesh. As long as
that is so, the interpretive commitments of a community which resists official

124. Keramet Reiter, The Pelican Bay Hunger Strike: Resistance Within the Structural

Constraints of a US Supermax Prison, 113 S. ATL. Q. 579, 585-87 (2014).
125. Jules Lobel, Essay, Mass Solitary and Mass Incarceration: Explaining the Dramatic Rise in

Prolonged Solitary in American Prisons, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 159, 165 (2020).
126. See David Mizner, Starving for Justice, NATION (Dec. 4, 2013), https://perma.cc/2NKL-

GR9A.
127. Reiter, supra note 124, at 588.
128. See generally Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantánamo: Rights at the Brink of
Dehumanization, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1683, 1758-62 (2009) (analyzing the relationship
between rights and prisoners’ hunger strikes at Guantanamo Bay).
129. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 7-8 (1983); Guinier & Torres, supra note 18, at 2759-60 (introducing the
term demosprudence to explain how “mobilized constituencies . . . introduce new
sources of interpretative authority” that are “as much a source of law as are statutes and
judicial decisions”).
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law must also be realized in the flesh, even if it be the flesh of its own
adherents.130

With the hunger strikes, the prisoners said “I am here,” and you must
recognize me as a person.131 Moreover, by their collective action of refusing to
eat, the prisoners were “creating a sense of collective existence and solidarity as
a prisoner class, which goes beyond the paradigmatic individual of human
rights discourse.”132
Third, the hunger strikes required close collaboration between the leaders
of the four main ethnic groups in California’s prisons (white, Black, Northern
Californian Hispanic, and Southern Californian Hispanic).133 For decades,
ethnic violence and riots wracked the California prison system.134 How were
prisoners from violent backgrounds—who were “validated” as gang members
or associates by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) and were used to fighting with each other—able to achieve such unity
in an increasingly racially polarized society?
Ironically, the CDCR’s attempt to create conditions of social isolation
aided the prisoners’ recognition of their common humanity. Antonio Guillen,
one of the hunger strike leaders, explained that California officials sought to
reinforce physical and social isolation by assigning prisoners from different
races and/or regional groups to a small, isolated pod containing eight prisoners
in adjoining cells.135 This CDCR policy backfired, because
[b]eing enclosed in such a small environment—a pod of eight cells—where at any
given time a man only has maybe seven other people in his immediate
surroundings for many years, one cannot help but to get to know his
neighbors . . . . At least for me, I soon realized that many of these men were no
different from who I am. We shared the same interests and things of importance,
and some of us even thought along the same lines. As time went by, we soon
started to share reading materials—books, magazines, newspapers etc.—and
provid[e] legal assistance—filing prisoner grievances and court litigation.136

130. Robert M. Cover, Essay, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1605 (1986).
131. Ahmad, supra note 128, at 1747; see BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE
AND REDEMPTION 180-81 (2014).

132. Lisa Guenther, Political Action at the End of the World: Hannah Arendt and the California

Prison Hunger Strikes, 4 CAN. J. HUM. RTS. 33, 35 (2015).
133. See Dale Noll, Note, Building a New Identity: Race, Gangs, and Violence in California

Prisons, 66 U. MIA. L. REV. 847, 850, 852-53 (2012).
134. See id. at 847-48; Sarah Spiegel, Comment, Prison “Race Riots”: An Easy Case for

Segregation?, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2261, 2275-76 (2007).
135. Antonio Guillen, Why I Joined the Multi-racial, Multi-regional Human Rights Movement to
Challenge Torture in the Pelican Bay SHU, S.F. BAY VIEW (Aug. 29, 2013),
https://perma.cc/W4TV-YHZR.
136. Id.
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Todd Ashker, another key leader, described how prisoners from different
ethnic groups came to realize their common interest and developed a class
consciousness in struggling “to be treated humanely.”137 For Ashker,
[t]his common experience together, with the group of us being housed together in
adjacent cells, wherein we engaged in dialogue about our common experience,
legal challenges, politics and the worsening conditions, enabled us to put aside
any disputes we may have harbored against each other and unite as a collective
group—a prisoner class—with the common goal of using nonviolent, peaceful
means to force meaningful, long-overdue prison reform to happen now.138

As leader Sitawa Nantambu Jamaa wrote, “We realize nothing productive can
be done to change the current state of our situation, our prison environment,
unless we end the hostilities between prisoners and end all racial and gang
violence within the CDCR.”139
Moreover, the prisoners’ very survival as humans in the SHU required
unity and common struggle. In the original call for hunger strikes, leader
Mutope Duguma said that the prisoners’ situation was a form of “psychological
and physical torture, as well as . . . civil death.”140
Eventually, the prisoners’ leaders formed a “Human Rights Movement,”
which concluded in a remarkable 2012 agreement to end all violence and
hostilities between the different racial and ethnic groups in the California
prison system.141 The agreement explained that “[i]f we really want to bring
about substantive meaningful changes to the CDCR system . . . now is the
time . . . for us to collectively seize this moment in time, and put an end to more
than 20-30 years of hostilities between our racial groups.”142 The prisoners’
newly constituted human rights movement viewed the agreement as central to
their cause, symbolizing the multiracial unity and nonviolent protest behind
the hunger strikes and charting a new path based on the common interests of
the prisoner class.
137. Exclusive Audio: CA Prisoner Todd Ashker on His Evolution from Violence to Peaceful Hunger

Strike, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Aug. 23, 2013), https://perma.cc/N8MM-LYS5.
138. Id.
139. Sitawa Nantambu Jamaa, CDCR’s $9.2 Billion Corruption Machine vs. Prison Human Rights

Movement, PRISONER HUNGER STRIKE SOLIDARITY (Aug. 18, 2013), https://perma.cc/
5BDW-ARRY.
140. Mutope Duguma, The Call, PRISONER HUNGER STRIKE SOLIDARITY, https://perma.cc/
4NWJ-CS2U (archived Oct. 2, 2021). See generally Guenther, supra note 132, at 45-54
(describing the concept of civil death and the prisoners’ resistance to it). The concepts
of civil and social death discussed in Guenther’s article find their fullest expression in
Guenther’s excellent book, LISA GUENTHER, SOLITARY CONFINEMENT: SOCIAL DEATH
AND ITS AFTERLIVES (2013).
141. Todd Ashker, Arturo Castellanos, Sitawa Nantambu Jamaa & Antonio Guillen, PBSPSHU Short Corridor Collective, Agreement to End Hostilities, Issued 8/12/2012, PRISONER
HUM. RTS. MOVEMENT (Aug. 12, 2012), https://perma.cc/75N2-RVR3.
142. Id.
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Finally, the prisoners’ demands reflected both an attempt to achieve
winnable reforms and a radical challenge to California’s policies. The hunger
strikers’ five “core” demands in April 2011 were: (1) “end group punishment
[and] administrative abuse”; (2) “abolish the debriefing policy, and modify
active/inactive gang status criteria”; (3) “comply with the [U.S.] Commission on
Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons[’] 2006 recommendations regarding an
end to long-term solitary confinement”; (4) “provide adequate and nutritious
food”; and (5) “expand and provide constructive programming and privileges
for indefinite SHU status inmates.”143
Keramet Reiter writes that in framing these demands, the hunger strikers
“situated themselves squarely within the law, successfully countering
correctional officials’ characterizations of them as ‘the worst of the worst,’
undeserving of legal protections, or outside of the law.”144 By doing so, the
strikers condemned their conditions of confinement without challenging the
legitimacy of the broader prison system imposing those conditions. Reiter
terms this a “legitimacy paradox.”145
The Pelican Bay hunger strikers’ demands were not revolutionary, but
their collective nonviolent action reflected a profound challenge to prison
officials’ dehumanizing control, which lies at the heart of mass solitary
confinement in the American prison system.146 By terming themselves a
“Human Rights Movement” and aligning with radical hunger strikers
internationally, the prisoners also transcended legalistic demands.147
By September 2011, the California prison hunger strikers and their
supporters had accomplished a great deal. They had forced California prison
officials to negotiate directly with their representatives,148 attracted national
and international media attention,149 and begun the process of norm creation
that Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres term “demosprudence.”150 But they had
not achieved any significant reforms.
143. Todd Ashker, Arturo Castellanos, Sitawa N. Jamaa, George Franco, Antonio Guillen,

144.
145.
146.
147.

148.
149.
150.

Lewis Powell, Paul Redd, Alfred Sandoval, Danny Troxell, James Williamson &
Ronnie Yandell, Prisoners’ Demands, PRISONER HUNGER STRIKE SOLIDARITY (Apr. 3, 2011)
(capitalization altered), https://perma.cc/22PL-EG89.
Reiter, supra note 124, at 581.
Id.
See Lobel, supra note 125, at 182-84.
See Reiter, supra note 124, at 588-89; Ashker et al., supra note 141. Indeed, Todd Ashker
may have looked to the hunger strike of Irish Republican Army member Bobby Sands
for inspiration. See Paige St. John, Prison Hunger Strike Leaders Are in Solitary but Not
Alone, L.A. TIMES (July 28, 2013, 12:00 AM PT), https://perma.cc/5ENU-D5D5.
See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Lovett, supra note 9.
See Guinier & Torres, supra note 18, at 2759-60.
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B. Choosing Clients and Framing Claims
The lawyers at the CCR took this case because of the powerful movement
the prisoners had organized and the injustices the prisoners were suffering.
Nonetheless, we at the CCR recognized the serious obstacles that representing
the prisoners would face. First, the case would require enormous financial
resources and attorney time—a difficult undertaking for the organization.
Second, participatory litigation requires close contact between lawyers and the
movement they represent.151 Pelican Bay is a seven-hour drive from San
Francisco, and almost double that from Los Angeles. The CCR attorneys and I
lived 3,000 miles away. Maintaining phone contact did not appear to be an
option because with few exceptions California forbade the prisoners from
making or taking any phone calls, even with lawyers.152
Third, the overwhelming majority of the prisoners were Hispanic or
Black, and the three key CCR attorneys—Rachel Meeropol, Alexis
Agathocleous, and I—were not. Could we adequately represent these prisoners?
While the hunger strikes, human rights movement, and ensuing lawsuit were
predicated on the idea of racial and ethnic unity against the torturous
conditions suffered by all prisoners in the SHU, racial tensions continued to
exist. For example, a key Black plaintiff at various points urged the CCR to
recruit a Black lawyer to our team, an effort which we made and were only
partially successful in accomplishing. In addition, as explained below, our
lawsuit expanded on a pro se lawsuit brought by two white plaintiffs. These
plaintiffs were initially my main point of contact with the prisoners, which
raised concerns among the Black plaintiffs that we were favoring the white
plaintiffs. The CCR lawyers believed that we could fairly and adequately
represent all of the racial and ethnic groups despite our composition, but it
required obtaining the trust of all the prisoners.
Our first step was assembling a team of California lawyers who had the
trust of the prisoners, could meet regularly with them, and were committed to
providing political support and advocacy tying the case to the broader hunger
strike movement. Some of these attorneys played an important role in the
Prisoner Hunger Strike Solidarity Coalition, formed in 2011 “to amplify the
voices of [California] prisoners on hunger strike striving to achieve their Five
Core Human Rights Demands.”153 Equally important, many of my fellow
151. Bryan Stevenson refers to this as “[p]roximity to the condemned, to people unfairly

judged.” See STEVENSON, supra note 131, at 14, 17-18.
152. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3282(g)(6) (2021) (providing wardens the discretion to
deny legal phone calls); Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 45;
Email from William Barnts, Litig. Coordinator, Pelican Bay State Prison, to author
(Feb. 10, 2012, 7:09 PM) (on file with author).
153. About, PRISONER HUNGER STRIKE SOLIDARITY, https://perma.cc/B47T-P6FB (archived
Oct. 2, 2021).
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attorneys had a deep commitment to regularly visiting prisoners and
responding to their letters, which proved essential to a participatory approach.
Later we added a significant reinforcement through the Bay Area office of a
national law firm, Weil, Gotshal & Manges.
1.

Choosing named plaintiffs

One of our guiding principles for the litigation was to reverse the
traditional role of class representatives. Unlike the client in a traditional
lawsuit, a class representative is usually a “token” or “decorative figurehead.”154
As one empirical survey concluded, there is “very little if any active attempt by
lawyers to organize class members to participate in the suit or to engage in
other activities complementary to the suit.”155 Our legal team rejected that
model and centered the Pelican Bay class-action suit around mutual
collaboration between the attorneys and prisoners.
Accordingly, the lawyers collaborated with the prisoners to determine the
named plaintiffs and class representatives. Consistent with academic writing
on the subject, the prisoners expected that lawyers would cherry-pick the
named plaintiffs so as to choose the most traditionally sympathetic
representatives and remove plaintiffs who might be troublesome.156 They
objected to that procedure, and we agreed with their objection.
We therefore did not just choose prisoners whose background had the
most compelling facts or prisoners who would draw the most sympathetic
response from a judge. Nor did we pick plaintiffs who would likely be passive.
Instead, the prisoners and the lawyers selected plaintiffs based on three criteria:
(1) leaders of the hunger strike, regardless of their prison record or criminal
offense; (2) those whose allegations would tell a powerful story; and (3) people
who served as representatives of each ethnic and racial group. Eventually we
154. Jean Wegman Burns, Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class Representatives in Class

Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 165, 181-82 (1990); Coffee, supra note 29, at 406 (“[I]n the class
action, the class representative is usually a token figure, with the class counsel being
the real party in interest.”).
155. Bryant Garth, Ilene H. Nagel & S. Jay Plager, The Institution of the Private Attorney
General: Perspectives from an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
353, 380-81 (1988).
156. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 41 (1991); Coffee, supra note 29, at 406 (“Typically, counsel finds the client in
order to launch its projected class action, not the reverse.”); Burns, supra note 154, at
183 (“The class attorney may even seek out a compliant class representative to avoid
client intrusion.”); White, supra note 26, at 545 (“One result of [designing reform
litigation] is that lawyers typically choose their plaintiffs strategically. The main
criterion is how good the story will look to the court, how closely it will comply with
a ‘fact pattern’ that will compel the desired legal remedy.”).
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selected ten named plaintiffs: two white, four Black, one Northern Californian
Hispanic, and three Southern Californian Hispanic prisoners. The plaintiffs
included three of the hunger strike’s four main representatives,157 and all ten
plaintiffs had been active participants in the hunger strikes.
2.

Deciding on claims

The main obstacle the lawsuit faced was substantive, stemming from the
forbidding legal landscape. A few years after Pelican Bay first opened in 1989, a
team of talented lawyers challenged solitary confinement in federal court. In
Madrid v. Gomez, Judge Thelton Henderson held the placement of seriously
mentally ill prisoners in prolonged solitary confinement at Pelican Bay
unconstitutional, but he found no constitutional violation for the majority of
prisoners without serious mental illness.158 Finding that harm suffered by
those without serious mental illness did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment, Judge Henderson discounted the evidence of substantial
psychological harm presented by two prominent experts.159 Our potential
clients did not want to claim that they were seriously mentally ill, so Madrid
had to be distinguished.
Moreover, Judge Henderson’s opinion in Madrid v. Gomez reflected the
judiciary’s general tolerance of the use of mass solitary confinement by
American prison officials. To pursue an Eighth Amendment complaint,
prisoners must demonstrate that prison officials deprived them of a basic
human need which the officials knew of but were deliberately indifferent to.160
Given this standard, various federal courts had taken the same approach as
Judge Henderson: Solitary confinement undoubtedly caused some mental
harm, but “[d]epression and anxiety are unfortunate concomitants of
incarceration,” and a “depressed mental state” alone was insufficient to set forth
an Eighth Amendment claim.161 Extreme isolation, despite its lack of
157. The four main representatives were Todd Ashker, Ron Dewberry (known as Sitawa

158.

159.
160.
161.

Jamaa), George Franco, and Arturo Castellanos. Ashker, Dewberry, and Franco were
named plaintiffs, but Castellanos decided that he did not want to become a named
plaintiff. See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 14-23 (listing the
suit’s plaintiffs). At times, Antonio Guillen served as one of the four representatives
instead of George Franco.
889 F. Supp. 1146, 1261, 1265 (N.D. Cal. 1995). In a separate but important part of the
Madrid opinion, Judge Henderson concluded that the Eighth Amendment’s restraint on
the use of excessive force by correctional officials against prisoners had been
repeatedly violated at Pelican Bay. Id. at 1161.
See id. at 1232-36, 1261-67.
See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297
(1991).
See, e.g., In re Long Term Admin. Segregation of Inmates Designated as Five Percenters,
174 F.3d 464, 472 (4th Cir. 1999). In Madrid, Judge Henderson found that “the conditions
footnote continued on next page

115

Participatory Litigation
74 STAN. L. REV. 87 (2022)

companionship and its restriction on intellectual stimulation, did not deprive
prisoners of a basic human need.162
Moreover, the CDCR’s claim that prolonged SHU confinement for any
gang-associated prisoner was necessary to contain and reduce prison violence
resonated with the courts. The CDCR’s justification for its isolation policy was
that gangs were a violent, destructive influence in California’s prisons and had
to be destroyed to protect other prisoners and maintain order.163 While the
Eighth Amendment test does not appear to consider whether a prison policy
serves a legitimate penological purpose164—torture is cruel and unusual even if
it purports to advance a goal—most courts did not want to interfere with
prison officials’ discretion to take measures to control violence. Judge
Henderson wrote in Madrid that while “the totality of the SHU conditions may
be harsher than necessary . . . we can not say that the conditions overall lack
any penological justification.”165 In Bruscino v. Carlson, Judge Posner wrote that
the conditions of solitary confinement at the United States Penitentiary in
Marion, Illinois, were “depressing in the extreme” but justified by the “history
of inmate violence.”166 Judge Posner noted that “[i]f order could be maintained
in Marion without resort to the harsh methods attacked in this lawsuit, the
plaintiffs would have a stronger argument that the methods were indeed cruel
and unusual punishments.”167 Similarly, Justice Kennedy, writing for a
unanimous Court in Wilkinson v. Austin, claimed that because prison security
was “imperiled by the brutal reality of prison gangs,” prolonged supermax
confinement “may be the State’s only option for the control of some
inmates.”168

162.
163.

164.

165.
166.
167.
168.

of extreme social isolation and reduced environmental stimulation found in the
Pelican Bay SHU will likely inflict some degree of psychological trauma upon most
inmates confined there for more than brief periods.” 889 F. Supp. at 1265. However, he
wrote, “for many inmates, it does not appear that the degree of mental injury suffered
significantly exceeds the kind of generalized psychological pain that courts have found
compatible with Eighth Amendment standards.” Id.
In re Long Term Admin. Segregation, 174 F. 3d at 472.
See generally David C. Pyrooz, Gang Affiliation and Restrictive Housing in U.S. Prisons, in
NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ NO. 250319, RESTRICTIVE HOUSING IN THE
U.S.: ISSUES, CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 117, 117-18 (2016).
Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 362 (4th Cir. 2019) (recognizing the “uncertain role of
penological justification in conditions of confinement cases”); Grenning v. MillerStout, 739 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The precise role of legitimate penological
interests is not entirely clear in the context of an Eighth Amendment challenge to
conditions of confinement.”).
889 F. Supp. at 1263.
854 F.2d 162, 163-66 (7th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 165.
545 U.S. 209, 227, 229 (2005).
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Given this legal and political background, the lawyers and prisoners
collaborated on how to present our claims and define the Eighth Amendment
class. A key challenge, endemic to struggles that seek to reform oppressive
institutions and systems, was how to translate the prisoners’ demands and
beliefs into cognizable legal claims. That tension caused difficulty in drafting
the complaint. The hunger strike demands called on the CDCR to “end
conditions of isolation.”169 But Madrid precluded us from arguing that solitary
confinement at Pelican Bay was per se unconstitutional.
Both the CCR and the prisoner-leaders believed that the litigation should
serve broader purposes than just winning in court: educating the public about
solitary confinement, publicizing prisoners’ stories, mobilizing supporters, and
allowing experts to review (and present the psychological and physical harm
caused by) the CDCR’s policies. The CCR has brought many cases that
appeared hopeless at the outset,170 including the Guantanamo Bay litigation171
and Austin v. Wilkinson.172 As such, we recognized the substantial possibility of
losing in court.
Nonetheless, we wanted to present a strong legal claim and hopefully win,
which required us to frame our Eighth Amendment claim in a way that
distinguished Judge Henderson’s Madrid decision. Unlike at least some of the
Madrid plaintiffs, the hunger strikers—while suffering serious mental harm
from years of solitary confinement—were not seriously mentally ill. The
prisoners sought to make a broad challenge to prolonged, indeterminate
solitary confinement rather than an incrementalist one based on specific
harms to vulnerable populations (such as those with serious mental illness).
The solution was to distinguish Madrid by defining our Eighth Amendment
class as prisoners held in solitary for a very long time, which the prisoners and
lawyers agreed to set as over ten years. This was much longer than the two to
three years prisoners had spent in the SHU when Madrid was tried. While that
decision narrowed our claim, it still encompassed some 500 prisoners at Pelican

169. Ashker et al., supra note 143 (capitalization altered); see also Solitary Confinement Should

Be Banned in Most Cases, UN Expert Says, UN NEWS (Oct. 18, 2011), https://perma.cc/
K46A-3PSN.
170. See generally JULES LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY: LOST LEGAL BATTLES AND THE
LONG ROAD TO JUSTICE IN AMERICA (2003) (recounting the CCR’s history of
unsuccessful litigation that nevertheless helped to fight injustice).
171. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Rasul v.
Bush, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., https://perma.cc/9QDY-M4NJ (last updated July 3, 2014);
Boumediene v. Bush/Al Odah v. United States, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., https://perma.cc/
TV24-GWN5 (last updated Jan. 20, 2010).
172. 189 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio 2002); Press Release, ACLU, Federal Judge Says Ohio
“Supermax” Prison Violates Constitutional Rights (Feb. 26, 2002), https://perma.cc/
V65E-UVYM.
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Bay.173 It also allowed us to focus on the outrageous duration of time that
people had been kept in isolation.174 Indeed, Judge Henderson had emphasized
that Madrid was based on the specific facts before the court at the time. He
expressly declined “to speculate on the impact that Pelican Bay SHU conditions
may have on inmates confined in the SHU for periods of 10 or 20 years or
more.”175 In that language we saw an opening.
The prisoners’ hunger strike, demanding that the CDCR agree to “end
long-term solitary confinement” and “release inmates to [the] general prison
population who have been warehoused indefinitely in [the] SHU for the last 10
to 40 years,” prefigured our legal claim.176 While ten years seemed like a
somewhat arbitrary number, it did clearly distinguish Madrid. That duration
also fit with prisoners’ reports that after approximately ten years in the SHU
they began to experience what psychologists and other experts termed a “social
death.”177
But it made us nervous that we were seemingly legitimizing shorter-term
solitary confinement for up to ten years, which we all thought still constituted
torture. Indeed, the problem of defining the class was simply one example of
the constraining aspects of litigation, in which our claims, remedies sought,
and litigation strategy were continually cabined by the procedural and
substantive restraints of the legal framework in which we operated.
The lawyers and plaintiffs agreed to use the complaint and the court
proceedings to let the plaintiffs describe the horrendous harm caused not by
merely weeks, months, or a few years in isolation, but by many years confined
in stultifying conditions. In the complaint, the plaintiffs described in detail
why social interaction was a basic human need: For example, very prolonged
SHU confinement deprived them of the ability to feel, to experience emotions,
“to the point of feeling ‘non-human.’”178 Plaintiff Danny Troxell explained
that he often felt as if in “a stupor,” while Luis Esquivel said that the lack of
feeling made his days go by “as if [he were] walking dead.”179 The plaintiffs’
statements and testimony would be supplemented by experts who could make
the case that (1) such isolation caused serious psychological pain, even to those
who were not mentally ill; and (2) that social interaction and environmental
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 166-167, 169-170.
Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
Ashker et al., supra note 143 (capitalization altered).
Expert Report of Craig Haney, Ph.D., J.D. ¶¶ 91, 97, 176, Ashker v. Brown, No. 09-cv05796 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2015), https://perma.cc/4PSU-5UPH; see GUENTHER, supra
note 140, at xx-xxiv.
178. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 131-132.
179. Id. ¶¶ 133, 136.
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stimulation were basic human needs, a claim that had not been presented to
Judge Henderson in Madrid. Eventually we secured two prominent
psychological experts to study and explain both the serious pain the plaintiffs
experienced and why prolonged solitary confinement led to “social death.”180
We also retained other experts: a neuroscientist suggested by one of the
plaintiffs to opine on the human brain’s need for social interaction; a social
scientist who demonstrated that the plaintiffs were statistically more likely to
suffer serious physical ailments (such as hypertension) because of their
prolonged solitary confinement; and a Berkeley social scientist who could
testify that the denial to plaintiffs of the ability to meaningfully touch another
human being deprived them of an essential human need.181
Both the lawyers and the plaintiffs also recognized the need to
demonstrate that the CDCR’s SHU policies were not penologically necessary.
The plaintiffs’ own stories demonstrated that they had been placed and
retained in the SHU not because of misconduct but because of their perceived
association with a gang. Tattoos, artwork, and cards had led to some plaintiffs’
SHU placement and retention.182 A number of the Black plaintiffs had been
held in the SHU because of their writings or books they were reading;183 one
was charged with possession of a pamphlet in Swahili, a banned language at
Pelican Bay State Prison.184 Others were placed and retained in the SHU based
on unsupported confidential information from prisoner informants.185 One
aspect of our Eighth Amendment claim was that of disproportionate
punishment186: We argued that the “[d]efendants have no legitimate
180. See Expert Report of Craig Haney, Ph.D., J.D., supra note 177, ¶¶ 1-4, 176; Expert Report

181.

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

of Terry A. Kupers, M.D., M.S.P. at 5-6, 10, 72, Ashker v. Governor of Cal., No. 09-cv05796 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2015), https://perma.cc/D593-QUU3.
See Expert Report of Matthew D. Lieberman at 10, Ashker v. Governor of Cal., No. 09cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2015), https://perma.cc/3G5D-ZR55; Expert Report of
Louise C. Hawkley at 14-16, Ashker v. Governor of Cal., No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 13, 2015), https://perma.cc/P9EC-34VR; Expert Report of Dr. Dacher Keltner,
Ph.D. ¶¶ 1, 23-24, Ashker v. Governor of Cal., No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2015),
https://perma.cc/HD6J-YB5Z.
See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 16, 18, 22, 93, 104-105, 107109, 115.
Id. ¶¶ 107-109.
Id. ¶ 109.
Id. ¶¶ 92-93, 108, 110.
Disproportionate punishment claims are rare in Eighth Amendment conditions-ofconfinement challenges. But the basic concept—that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
punishments which are disproportionate to the misconduct committed—is deeply
rooted in Eighth Amendment law and ought to be applicable to conditions litigation.
See Alexander A. Reinert, Eighth Amendment Gaps: Can Conditions of Confinement
Litigation Benefit From Proportionality Theory?, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 53, 54-56, 61-68
(2009).
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penological interest in retaining prisoners indefinitely in the debilitating
conditions of the SHU simply because they are gang members or associates,
without recent, serious disciplinary or gang-related infractions.”187 This policy
and practice was thus not “rationally related to [any] legitimate security
needs.”188
In addition to the experts above, we eventually retained prominent
experts to support the prisoners’ claims that the CDCR’s policies were
unnecessary and misguided. Two high-level state prison officials in states that
had reformed their solitary-confinement policies argued that keeping
prisoners who had not committed any misconduct in the SHU did not promote
prison security.189 James Austin, the nation’s leading expert on prison
classifications, demonstrated that the CDCR’s policies had not reduced violence
in California’s prisons.190 He further opined that the classification system used
for the plaintiffs promoted an excessive number of false positives, “which
allowed for the incorrect placement of a significant population of inmates in
the SHU for excessive periods of time.”191 After reviewing the plaintiffs’
(relatively minor) disciplinary histories, Austin concluded that “[a] system that
places such inmates in SHU for over a decade defies all logic.”192
Finally, many of the prisoner-leaders had begun to frame their complaints
in terms of human rights.193 In writing the Ashker complaint, the prisoners and
lawyers agreed to incorporate international human rights concerns, including
the allegation that California’s practice of prolonged, indefinite solitary
confinement “violate[d] international human rights norms and civilized
standards of humanity and human dignity.”194 The prisoners on hunger strike
and their supporters had asked the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture Juan
Méndez to visit and report on conditions at the Pelican Bay SHU. Méndez, who
had been tortured and subjected to solitary confinement in his native
Argentina, had requested permission from the U.S. Department of State to visit
187. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 185.
188. Id.
189. See Expert Report of Terry J. Collins ¶¶ 1, 14, 20-21, Ashker v. Governor of Cal.,

190.
191.
192.
193.

194.

No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2015), https://perma.cc/CAB6-9PNR; Expert
Report of Emmitt L. Sparkman ¶¶ 1-7, 15, 25-27, Ashker v. Governor of Cal., No. 09cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2015), https://perma.cc/RZ3P-HKWU.
Expert Report of Dr. James Austin, Ph.D. ¶ 39, Ashker v. Governor of Cal., No. 09-cv05796 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2015), https://perma.cc/U6J4-MNQB.
Id. ¶¶ 16-18.
Id. ¶ 33.
See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 156-157 (noting that
plaintiffs Ashker and Troxell sent a formal human rights complaint to the governor of
California in 2010 and again in 2011); see also Ashker et al., supra note 141.
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 146.
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in his official capacity, but he never got a response.195 As the case progressed,
we asked Méndez to visit unofficially as an Ashker expert witness. He did, and
he filed a report which not only unequivocally criticized California for
violating international norms, but also noted that California’s practices were
unique in the world.196 His report stated that while he had visited numerous
countries and reported on their prison systems, “I know of no other country
that keeps substantial numbers of prisoners in decades-long solitary
confinement simply because of membership in or affiliation with groups such
as gangs.”197 Andrew Coyle, an internationally recognized expert on prison
management and former high-level prison official in England and Scotland,
also agreed to be an expert witness on the inconsistency between California’s
SHU practices and prison-management practices generally accepted around the
world.198
In drafting the complaint and developing strategy, the lawyers and
prisoners therefore sought to continue the process that the prisoners
themselves had begun during their hunger strike: situating themselves within
the boundaries of the law, while at the same time seeking to move those
boundaries significantly. We sought to expand the Eighth Amendment
formulation of basic human needs to include social interaction and
environmental stimulation. The prisoners’ basic response to the prison
officials’ claims argued that prisoners be placed in solitary confinement not
based on mere association but instead only for proven bad behavior such as
murder or assault. Moreover, the prisoners argued that they should not be
placed in solitary confinement indefinitely, but instead for some limited period
of time related to the proven misconduct. Finally, the prisoners asked the
CDCR to accord them due process before SHU placement to protect against
overclassification. After a lengthy court case and a political battle, California
officials eventually agreed to our demands.
In consultation with the prisoners, we decided not to include a racialdiscrimination claim despite the clear racism reflected in the overwhelmingly
Black and Hispanic (but predominantly Hispanic) SHU population. The
prisoners wanted to maintain unity, and such a claim might have undermined

195. Sara Shourd, Why the U.S. Won’t Let the U.N. Look Inside Its Prisons, DAILY BEAST (updated

Apr. 14, 2017, 11:54 AM ET), https://perma.cc/WX9R-4F9K.
196. Expert Report of Juan E. Méndez ¶¶ 44-45, 48-52, 58-60, Ashker v. Governor of Cal.,

No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2015), https://perma.cc/3MLF-UDAX.
197. Id. ¶¶ 44-45.
198. Expert Report of Andrew Coyle, PhD ¶¶ 1-8, 39-47, Ashker v. Governor of Cal.,

No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2015), https://perma.cc/BMM9-CCS3.
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that goal. The prisoners did not include a race-discrimination claim in their
hunger strike demands, and the complaint tracked those demands.199
On one matter of importance, the lawyers and some of the prisoners had a
disagreement in which the lawyers prevailed. That was undoubtedly due to our
position of power. We chose to file this class-action suit by amending a 2009
pro se complaint brought by two of the white hunger strike leaders—Todd
Ashker and Danny Troxell—then pending before Judge Wilken of the
Northern District of California. That complaint sought damages in addition to
injunctive relief. The lawyers decided, however, that we did not have the
resources to litigate a claim for both an injunction and damages. We might
spend years determining how much money to award each prisoner, and
qualified immunity presented an obstacle to winning damages in the first place.
Despite their preference, the plaintiffs accepted our reasons for withdrawing
their damages claim in the amended complaint.200
Finally, we decided that immediately upon filing we would challenge the
CDCR’s bar on phone calls with attorneys. While the California lawyers
regularly visited prisoners, I could not do so based on my location. But in our
participatory model it was important for me, as the main representative of the
CCR on the legal team, to maintain regular personal communication with the
plaintiffs.201
After Judge Wilken accepted our Second Amended Complaint with ten
class representatives, we sought regular phone calls with the named plaintiffs.
The CDCR adamantly refused, so we moved for phone calls before Magistrate
Judge Vadas. (Judge Wilken had designated Magistrate Judge Vadas to hear
discovery and other preliminary disputes.) After Magistrate Judge Vadas
indicated that he would rule in our favor, the CDCR agreed to permit one-hour
phone calls with five named plaintiffs every two weeks.

199. It also would have been difficult to assert such a claim based on the statistics of

discrimination and the difficulty of proving intent to discriminate. See Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298-99 (1987).
200. More recently, Ashker filed a new complaint seeking damages for the continuing harm
that the CDCR has caused him. Ashker v. Kernan, No. C 18-6350, 2021 WL 930456, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2021). At least one recent class-action suit challenging solitary
confinement has resulted in monetary compensation. Rebecca Feldhaus Adams, Rikers
Settles Class Action Solitary Confinement Case, NPR (Dec. 13, 2017 4:49 PM ET),
https://perma.cc/8ZA4-SLMJ.
201. On the complaint and other court papers I was the first named lawyer, and therefore
sometimes was referred to as the lead attorney. But in practice our legal team operated
cooperatively, and the title of lead attorney had more of a symbolic significance than
any practical meaning. At first I did the courtroom appearances for the CCR, but later
different attorneys argued parts of the case.
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C. Amplifying Plaintiffs’ Voices
Participatory lawyering requires the lawyer, to the extent possible, to aid
the client in speaking and articulating her claims in her own voice. In the most
profound and impressive participatory-lawyering initiatives involving
individuals, the lawyer, law student, and/or community aids the worker,202
tenant or homeowner,203 or criminal defendant204 in presenting her own case
in court in the context of community mobilization and family support. Impact
and class-action litigation, however, severely limit the opportunities for class
members’ voices to be heard. The best the lawyer often can do is to accurately
reflect the voices of the marginalized people she represents, to speak for them
and to stand for them.205 To do so, the lawyer has to collaborate closely with
her plaintiffs, understand what they want, and know what they would say if
given the opportunity.
At trial, plaintiffs are afforded the opportunity to testify, but testimony
generally occurs in a carefully circumscribed and choreographed legal context.
The lawyer guides the plaintiff in a manner that supports the legal claim, and
the legal claim is the one the lawyer believes offers the best chance of
success.206 We sought to transcend this model and find a mechanism that
allowed the prisoners’ voices to be heard through the litigation. The task was
daunting in that the CDCR severely limited media interviews with SHU
prisoners.207
On May 31, 2012, we filed a motion to amend Todd Ashker and Danny
Troxell’s pro se complaint. Our forty-seven page Proposed Amended
Complaint was not a concise summary of the facts favored by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure;208 rather, it articulated in great detail the plaintiffs’ own
descriptions of their oppression. We also worked with Gabriel Reyes, one of
the amended complaint’s ten named plaintiffs, on an op-ed which he published

202. See Gordon, supra note 37, at 443-44.
203. Nicholas Hartigan, Special Project, No One Leaves: Community Mobilization as a Response
204.

205.
206.
207.
208.

to the Foreclosure Crisis in Massachusetts, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 181, 191 (2010).
Janet Moore, Marla Sandys & Raj Jayadev, Make Them Hear You: Participatory Defense
and the Struggle for Criminal Justice Reform, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1281, 1289 (2014-2015);
Cynthia Godsoe, Participatory Defense: Humanizing the Accused and Ceding Control to the
Client, 69 MERCER L. REV. 715, 716 (2018).
This is akin to what Hanna Pitkin termed “acting for” representation. PITKIN, supra
note 50, at 112-15.
See, e.g., White, supra note 79, at 21-32.
See Adrian Shirk, Why Don’t You Ever See TV Interviews with Inmates?, ATLANTIC (July 15,
2014), https://perma.cc/VL8X-K5LM.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
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the same date we filed our motion.209 Reyes explained the brutal facts of his
solitary confinement, which had lasted more than sixteen years even though
he was not convicted of a violent crime and had only two disciplinary
violations during his incarceration. One violation was for donating his
artwork to a nonprofit organization, and the second was for participating in
the 2011 hunger strikes.210 Reyes concluded by saying he recognized that he
“broke the law, and . . . lost liberties because of that. But no one, no matter what
they’ve done, should be denied fundamental human rights, especially when
that denial comes in the form of such torture.”211 The CCR also posted and
publicized personal statements from most of the ten named plaintiffs as well as
several of their family members.212
We also searched for a mechanism to humanize our clients by having
them speak to the public by audio and video. The CDCR’s proscriptions meant
that these prisoners had been disembodied and silenced: Their voices were only
heard secondhand in news articles about the hunger strikes. As neuroscientists
now recognize, actually “observing someone else’s suffering can evoke a deep
sense of distress and sadness—almost as if it’s happening to us.”213 For several
years we were unable to accomplish our goal. Eventually, we insisted that the
CDCR videotape the plaintiffs’ depositions, and the defendants agreed to do so.
After we received the deposition videos, the CCR made a short video
composed of clips from some of the depositions. When we served ten expert
reports on the defendants in March 2015, we sent redacted public versions to
the New York Times along with the video we had made. The Times published a
lengthy story about the expert reports on the front page of one of their
sections and linked the video.214 The powerful four-and-a-half-minute video
sequence featured four plaintiffs—Todd Ashker, George Franco, Gabriel Reyes,
and Paul Redd—discussing the effects of solitary confinement. Perhaps the
most dramatic moment was when Paul Redd, a powerfully built fifty-eightyear-old man, said that “sometimes I’m at the point that I’d feel like going right
209. Gabriel Reyes, Opinion, The Crime of Punishment at Pelican Bay State Prison, SFGATE

(updated Nov. 27, 2012, 2:41 PM), https://perma.cc/KZF2-KJLS.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Pelican Bay Prison Hunger-Strikers, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., https://perma.cc/G47D-GJC3

(last updated July 16, 2013) (detailing through an editorial series the stories of SHU
prisoners and their families).
213. Kim Armstrong, “I Feel Your Pain”: The Neuroscience of Empathy, ASS’N FOR PSYCH. SCI.:
OBSERVER (Dec. 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/Z7KE-2NC7.
214. Erica Goode, Solitary Confinement: Punished for Life, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2015),
https://perma.cc/ZG6G-G7CB. The Times produced their own video from the
deposition clips we sent them, but their video was very similar to the video produced
by the CCR.
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to the judge [and saying], ‘Just give me the death penalty,’” and then broke
down crying.215
A key aspect of participatory lawyering is community and family
participation. We were fortunate that the hunger strikes spawned a strong
group of prisoner family members, California Families Against Solitary
Confinement (CFASC).216 We worked closely with family members: A family
member spoke at many of our press conferences, and I often met with the
CFASC in Los Angeles. On reflection, however, most of my meetings with the
prisoners’ families utilized the traditional hierarchical model. I gave a
presentation on the case that everyone could understand, followed by a lively
question and answer session.217
In court, the lawyers spoke for the prisoners, except for one dramatic
incident in the monitoring phase after settlement.218 Otherwise, prisoners
could not participate in the courtroom hearings or conferences.219 Despite
these limitations, we did have some success in using the litigation to amplify
the voices of our plaintiffs and their families.
D. The Plaintiffs Take the Lead: Supporting the Prisoner Hunger Strike
During Litigation
One problem with impact litigation is that it often takes years before
plaintiffs get any relief. This delay can sap a dynamic movement of its
momentum. We therefore sought to fast-track the class-action suit: The
plaintiffs and lawyers agreed to move for a preliminary injunction shortly
after filing the complaint. When I raised that plan at our first conference with
215. Colin Archdeacon & Ctr. for Const. Rts., Effects of Solitary Confinement, N.Y. TIMES

216.

217.

218.
219.

(Aug. 3, 2015), https://perma.cc/QKR5-TZ3E; Paul Redd Deposition Transcript 3
(2015), https://perma.cc/5835-KJLL.
Ben Brazil, Dolores Canales Fights for an End to Solitary Confinement (Aug. 20, 2020,
3:30 PM PT), L.A. TIMES: DAILY PILOT, https://perma.cc/5MRE-WDY9 (tracing the
history of the group and Dolores Canales’s role in starting it).
In my most recent meeting with family members and released class members on
August 14, 2021, my reflections led to some significant modifications of the usual
meeting format. First, we started with fairly in-depth presentations from family
members and ex-prisoners about their own histories and activities. Those
presentations took a substantial portion of the meeting, but they allowed me to gain
insights into our class members’ and their families’ lives and perspectives. These
insights will undoubtedly be helpful in the future. Moreover, after I gave an update on
the litigation, there were not only questions and answers, but also a very productive
strategy session which came up with some excellent ideas going forward.
See infra Part II.G.
Early on in the litigation, I requested that one or two plaintiffs be able to attend court
hearings via videoconference, but Judge Wilken denied that request. See Transcript of
Proceedings at 45, Ruiz v. Brown, No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2013), ECF No. 198.
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Judge Wilken, however, she clearly was not keen on such a strategy. We
abandoned the idea.
That meant that our case proceeded at what seemed to the plaintiffs like a
snail’s pace. After Judge Wilken granted us leave to amend, the defendants filed
a motion to dismiss. Judge Wilken, writing a strong opinion distinguishing
Madrid and other cases, denied that motion in April 2013.220 Yet almost a year
had passed since we had moved to file an amended complaint. Accordingly, the
prisoners grew increasingly frustrated. The CDCR did begin to make reforms
by initiating the Step Down Program (SDP), which transferred some prisoners
out of Pelican Bay to other SHUs around the state or placed them into general
population units.221 But the prisoners rejected this program as a negligible
reform where many would still be condemned to a lifetime in solitary
confinement.222
In spring 2013, the lawyers learned that the prisoners were contemplating
another hunger strike. The CDCR considered such a strike misconduct,
warranting disciplinary action. We neither encouraged nor dissuaded the
prisoners. Our view was that they had a right to nonviolent protest, and we
would support them if they chose that route.223
On July 8, 2013, over 30,000 prisoners throughout California went on
hunger strike,224 attracting national and international news attention.225 The
2013 strike made clear that prisoners, not lawyers, were the key actors in the
movement against prolonged solitary confinement in California. Using our
phone access and legal visits, we transmitted the prisoners’ positions and views
220. Ashker v. Brown, No. 09-cv-05796, 2013 WL 1435148, at *5-6, *9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9,

2013).
221. Defendants’ Notice of Motion & Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended

222.

223.

224.
225.

Complaint, or Alternatively, to Stay; Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 6-8,
Ruiz v. Brown, No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2013), ECF No. 160; Memorandum
from Kathleen L. Dickinson, Dir., Div. of Adult Insts. & Anthony Chaus, Chief, Off. of
Corr. Safety, to Assoc. Dirs., Div. of Adult Insts. & Wardens 40-50 (Oct. 11, 2012),
https://perma.cc/ZR92-LRTN (describing the SDP).
Victoria Law, Seven Months After Historic Prison Hunger Strike, Opponents of Solitary in
California Gauge the Pace of Change, SOLITARY WATCH (Feb. 10, 2014), https://perma.cc/
F3PK-N4ET (quoting prisoner criticisms of the SDP).
We thus avoided one criticism of litigation: that “after a social movement becomes
focused on legal strategies, other avenues and strategies for social struggle such as
protests, illicit strikes, and pickets are habitually condemned as deviant.” Lobel, supra
note 53, at 956.
Learn More, PRISONER HUNGER STRIKE SOLIDARITY, https://perma.cc/D6LS-RLEP
(archived Oct. 2, 2021).
See, e.g., Jennifer Medina, Hunger Strike by California Inmates, Already Large, Is Expected to
Be Long, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2013), https://perma.cc/629J-5WDZ; Two Month
California Prison Hunger Strike Ends, BBC NEWS (Sept. 5, 2013), https://perma.cc/47DNNPLV.
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to the outside world, contacted their families, provided companionship, and
played a supportive role in the media. We intervened with Clark Kelso, the
receiver overseeing the CDCR’s medical system, to get the CDCR to allow the
prisoners to drink Gatorade. We sought to prevent the CDCR from forcefeeding prisoners on hunger strike. We also contemplated seeking preliminary
injunctive relief from Judge Wilken due to the emergency created by the
strike. But we ultimately realized that Judge Wilken was extremely unlikely to
grant such relief.
CDCR officials again attacked the hunger strike as gang inspired. Jeffrey
Beard, the newly appointed secretary of the CDCR,226 wrote an op-ed in the
Los Angeles Times entitled “Hunger Strike in California Prisons Is a Gang Power
Play.”227 Beard warned the public not to be fooled, because the strike was called
by “violent prison gangs . . . in an attempt to restore their ability to terrorize
fellow prisoners, prison staff and communities throughout California.”228
What Beard ignored was that the hunger strikes represented years of
prisoner anger and frustration, both at the CDCR’s policy of indeterminate
solitary confinement and the unconstitutional and unreliable process for
determining who was an active gang member. The CDCR’s policy was
ineffective in preventing violence in California’s prisons, and it amounted to
torture for those ensnared in its grip. Eventually, ten internationally
prominent experts submitted reports on behalf of the plaintiffs supporting
those conclusions.229
Beard’s op-ed reflected the CDCR’s intransigence in refusing to accede to
the hunger strikers’ demands. As the strike dragged on into late August, about
100 prisoners, including most of our named plaintiffs, still refused to eat. These
prisoners were prepared to die, but they eventually ended the hunger strike
when my co-counsel Anne Weills and others convinced key California
legislators to hold hearings on the CDCR’s use of solitary confinement. The
incarcerated had not won anything tangible. But they had accomplished the
monumental feat of organizing 30,000 prisoners to engage in a hunger strike,
refocusing national attention on California. It was multifaceted advocacy, with
the prisoners leading the way.

226. Tonya Chin, Jeffrey Beard Confirmed as CDCR Secretary, BOND BUYER (July 12, 2013,

2:55 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/YC6U-8ZQF.
227. Jeffrey Beard, Opinion, Hunger Strike in California Prisons Is a Gang Power Play, L.A.

TIMES (Aug. 6, 2013, 12:00 AM PT), https://perma.cc/CJU3-JNRP.
228. Id.
229. Expert Reports in Ashker v. Brown, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., https://perma.cc/QLC6-URX5

(last updated Aug. 3, 2015); see also supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the expert reports).
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E. Legal Strategy and Tactics: Participation at Work
A basic tenet of legal ethics is that, while clients decide “the objectives of
representation,” the lawyer has “responsibility for technical and legal tactical
issues.”230 That traditional division of responsibilities follows a formalist
model of representation, in which the client gives the lawyer authority and the
lawyer manages the client’s affairs with minimal interference (subject, of
course, to the client’s authority to fire the lawyer). More recently, an increased
level of client involvement has gained widespread acceptance, requiring more
lawyer–client consultation and interaction.231 The legal code of ethics,
however, still requires only that the lawyer “consult with the client as to the
means by which [the client’s objectives] are to be pursued,”232 placing ultimate
legal decisionmaking power in the lawyer’s hands.233
The Supreme Court recently discussed the distinction between objectives
and means in the context of a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
assistance of counsel. In McCoy v. Louisiana, the Court held that a defendant’s
autonomy to make decisions as to the “objective of the defense” includes her
right to “insist on maintaining her innocence at the guilt phase of a capital
trial.”234 A criminal defendant’s decisions on whether to plead guilty, waive a
jury trial, testify, and forgo an appeal “are not strategic choices about how best
to achieve a client’s objectives; they are choices about what the client’s
objectives in fact are.”235 In contrast, “[t]rial management is the lawyer’s
province”236: Questions of “what arguments to pursue, what evidentiary
objections to raise, and what agreements to conclude regarding the admission
of evidence” do not require client consent.237
The objective–means distinction thus empowers lawyers to make a large
swath of important decisions on behalf of their clients. And lower courts have
narrowly interpreted the scope of client objectives: In United States v. Wilson,
230. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); id. r. 1.2 cmt. (Scope of

Representation).
231. Comm. on Pro. Resp., The Evolving Lawyer-Client Relationship and Its Effect on the

Lawyer’s Professional Obligations, 51 REC. ASS’N BAR CITY N.Y. 443, 443-44 (1996).
232. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.2(a). For example, the comments to Model Rule of

233.
234.
235.
236.
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Professional Conduct 1.4 point out that “a lawyer ordinarily cannot be expected to
describe trial or negotiation strategy in detail.” Id. r. 1.4 cmt.; see also White, supra
note 79, at 29 (“I felt myself saying too much. Why had I even raised the question of
which story to tell? It was a tactical decision—not the kind of issue that clients were
supposed to decide.”).
Comm. on Pro. Resp., supra note 231, at 458.
138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508 (2018).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 248 (2008)).
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for example, the Third Circuit held that “whether to contest or concede a
jurisdictional element [of an alleged crime] is a tactical decision reserved for
counsel, not defendants.”238 Indeed, in both the civil and criminal context, the
current ethics rules “leave the lawyer relatively free to decide strategic and
tactical questions as he or she sees fit, even in the face of a client’s
objections.”239
Lawyers maintain even more control over the litigation in the class-action
context, and fundamental issues such as settlement are generally viewed as
within the lawyer’s control even when the named plaintiffs are opposed.240
The same is true in complex litigation, where ethical and constitutional rules
are interpreted to accord the lawyer greater decisionmaking authority under
the theory that the client is ill-equipped to make complicated legal
determinations.241 Lawyers generally control the litigation because it is easier,
it causes less stress, and it lets them avoid dealing with difficult clients. Clients
embrace this behavior in certain cases because they are content to let attorneys
decide legal issues without their input. In addition, most lawyers think that
they are better situated, better educated, and more objective when it comes to
deciding strategic litigation matters. Impact lawyers in particular are not
trained to act differently, and they often believe that the client does not have
much to offer when it comes to complex matters. What these lawyers ignore is
that clients often do have a great deal of knowledge about and experience with
the issues in the lawsuit and that legal strategy can benefit from more
collaborative decisionmaking.
In the Pelican Bay litigation, the lawyers proceeded from a radically
different perspective regarding lawyer–client roles. Most of the important
litigation decisions, whether related to tactical moves or overall objectives,
were made collaboratively. Often there were differing opinions between
lawyers of different backgrounds, politics, and temperaments, different
perspectives between the lawyers and those incarcerated, and disagreements
among the plaintiffs themselves. Nevertheless, the lawyers and plaintiffs
respected one another’s opinions, skills, and insights, enabling us to make
decisions collaboratively and collectively. This approach generally prevented
the conflicts that can surface in group representation from hindering our

238. 960 F.3d 136, 143-44 (3d Cir. 2020). Shepardizing McCoy in July 2021 led to 125 lower-

court decisions distinguishing or urging caution in applying the case and just twentyseven citing it positively.
239. Todd A. Berger, The Constitutional Limits of Client -Centered Decision Making, 50 U. RICH.
L. REV. 1089, 1107-08 (2016).
240. Ellmann, supra note 28, at 1118-19.
241. Berger, supra note 239, at 1102 & n.48.
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litigation efforts or forcing the lawyers to decide which interests should
prevail.242
The first major tactical decision in which the prisoners played a role
involved our due process argument. In the amended complaint, we broadly
alleged that the defendants had violated due process in placing and retaining
prisoners in the SHU.243 However, it was more difficult to challenge placement
than retention on due process grounds. In Wilkinson v. Austin, the Supreme
Court held that although the prisoners in an Ohio supermax had a liberty
interest, the procedure required before their administrative confinement was
somewhat flexible.244 The procedures approved of in Wilkinson afforded less
protection than those necessary for punitive confinement in Wolff v.
McDonnell,245 and the Ninth Circuit had dismissed claims that SHU placement
violated due process under the lesser administrative standard.246 We therefore
focused our complaint not on placement but on retention, arguing that (1) six
years between reviews was obscenely long; (2) review criteria were vague and
misleading; and (3) the entire review process was meaningless.247
Just before the defendants filed their motion to dismiss, we received a
lengthy document, entitled Memorandum of Points and Authorities Submitted
for Consideration by Class Counsel and Representatives on Cruel and Unusual
Punishment and Due Process, from a Pelican Bay SHU prisoner named Edward
Dumbrique.248 Dumbrique, who had a GED, participated in the hunger strikes,
corresponded with me prior to our filing the complaint, and had been thinking
about filing a lawsuit challenging confinement in the SHU. Dumbrique’s

242. See William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty
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244.
245.
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248.

Law Scholarship in the Post-modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIA. L. REV. 1099, 1107 (1994);
Ellmann, supra note 28, at 1106.
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 200-202.
See 545 U.S. 209, 224-29 (2005); see also supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
418 U.S. 539 (1974); Elli Marcus, Comment, Toward a Standard of Meaningful Review:
Examining the Actual Protections Afforded to Prisoners in Long-Term Solitary Confinement,
163 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1178 (2015).
Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he heightened standard of Wolff v.
McDonnell [does not apply] because ‘California’s policy of assigning suspected gang
affiliates to the [SHU] is not a disciplinary measure, but an administrative strategy
designed to preserve order . . . .’ ” (citation omitted) (quoting Munoz v. Rowland, 104
F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 1997))); Cervantes v. Adams, 507 F. App’x 644, 644 (9th Cir.
2013); Mitchell v. Marshall, 564 F. App’x 324, 325 (9th Cir. 2014).
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 96-119, 195, 200-202.
Memorandum of Points and Authorities Submitted for Consideration by Class Counsel
and Representatives on Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Due Process from Edward
Dumbrique to author (Sept. 2012) (on file with author).
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memorandum was his response to my letter soliciting his “legal and factual
insights, and strategic and tactical views.”249
Dumbrique argued that a 2010 amendment to California law that
prevented gang-validated prisoners who were held in the SHU for
administrative reasons from earning good-time credits250 rendered SHU
confinement punitive, requiring the hearing procedures set forth in Wolff. 251
When I reviewed Dumbrique’s memorandum, I was impressed but
unconvinced. Dumbrique’s argument was very clever, but my initial
impression was that it was foreclosed by Wilkinson’s holding that the Wolff
framework did not apply when the state’s rationale was administrative rather
than disciplinary.252 But upon reflection and after some research, I thought
Dumbrique’s argument about the punitive nature of the loss of good-time
credits was sound. I raised Dumbrique’s point with the lawyers and named
plaintiffs, and we agreed to forcefully brief it in our opposition to the
defendants’ motion to dismiss.253
At the hearing on the defendants’ motion to dismiss before Judge Wilken,
a significant part of the argument involved Dumbrique’s point.254 Judge
Wilken denied the defendants’ motion, holding that under Mathews we had
adequately pled a due process violation.255 Judge Wilken withheld judgment
on Dumbrique’s Wolff argument, determining that the court “need not decide
at this stage whether [the plaintiffs] are entitled to the specific hearing
procedures described in Wolff v. McDonnell.”256 Eventually, the state accepted
Dumbrique’s claim, agreeing that the CDCR would not place prisoners in the
SHU based on gang validation, but instead would do so only after a guilty
finding in a disciplinary hearing conducted pursuant to the requirements of
Wolff. 257
249. Letter from author to Edward Dumbrique 2 (Dec. 7, 2011) (on file with author).
250. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2933.6(a) (West 2010) (amended 2017); see also id. §§ 2933, 2933.05.
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Good-time credits generally reduce the sentence that prisoners must serve and are
earned by prisoners who remain free of major misconduct. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 546
n.6.
Memorandum of Law on State and Federal Due Process Violations from Edward
Dumbrique to author 1, 3-7 (Sept. 2012) (on file with author).
See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 228-29 (2005).
See Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Second Amended
Complaint at 12-13, Ruiz v. Brown, No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2013), 2013 U.S.
Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 9353, at *26-29, ECF No. 178.
Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 219, at 11-12, 19-21, 29.
Ashker v. Brown, No. 09-cv-05796, 2013 WL 1435148, at *6-9 (N.D. Cal Apr. 9, 2013); see
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
Ashker, 2013 WL 1435148, at *9.
Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 13, 15-16, Ashker v. Governor of Cal., No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D.
Cal. Sep. 1, 2015), ECF No. 424-2.
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Prior to the hearing on the defendants’ motion to dismiss, another tactical
issue arose in which prisoners again played a leading role. In March 2013, at the
suggestion of plaintiff Todd Ashker, we requested mediation.258
I was somewhat reluctant to agree to mediation, thinking it would lead
only to delay. Moreover, the lawyers wanted to establish a precedent holding
that prolonged solitary confinement constituted cruel and usual punishment.
Nonetheless, Ashker convinced us and other plaintiffs that requesting
mediation would put the defendants on the defensive and be viewed favorably
by Judge Wilken. Judge Wilken ordered settlement talks before Magistrate
Judge Vadas.259 Ashker’s idea would eventually lead to dramatic results.260
Perhaps the plaintiffs’ most dramatic tactical intervention took place
approximately nine months before settlement. By winter 2014-2015, we had
made considerable progress. Our due process and Eighth Amendment classes
were certified, we had obtained valuable discovery, and our ten prominent
experts were nearing completion of their reports. Trial was scheduled to begin
before Judge Wilken on December 7, 2015. However, the CDCR’s actions
complicated our strategy.
In October 2014, the CDCR made its pilot SDP (Step Down Program)
permanent,261 accelerating its efforts to moot or at least dramatically
undermine the plaintiffs’ claims.262 By late 2014, only about half of the original
Eighth Amendment class, and only two named plaintiffs, remained at Pelican
Bay’s SHU. The other eight plaintiffs had been transferred pursuant to the SDP
to either another, slightly less restrictive SHU, or to a highly restrictive
general population (GP) prison.263
The CDCR’s reform program could easily have split the plaintiffs, who
now faced somewhat different situations, presenting typical class-conflict
problems. Moreover, the lawyers and prisoners had different responses to the
situation.

258. See Joint Case Management Conference Statement at 13, Ruiz v. Brown, No. 09-cv-
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Settlement Conference in Pro Se Prisoner Early Settlement Program, Requiring Meet
and Confer, and Setting Status Conference at 1, Ashker v. Brown, No. 09-cv-05796
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2013), ECF No. 192.
See infra Part II.F.
Order Granting Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint at 2-3, Ashker v.
Governor of Cal., No. 09-cv-05796, (N.D. Cal Mar. 9, 2015), ECF No. 387 [hereinafter
Order Granting Motion].
See Transcript of Proceedings at 24-25, Ashker v. Governor of Cal., No. 09-cv-05796
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2015), ECF No. 385.
Order Granting Motion, supra note 261, at 3-4, 4 n.1.
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The lawyers wanted to push ahead quickly, finish our expert reports, file a
motion for summary judgment on our due process claim, and not make any
move that might delay trial. The prisoners, however, wanted us to file a
supplemental complaint to challenge the CDCR’s transfer of class members to
different SHUs and even to GP without changing their isolation.
The lawyers resisted filing a supplemental complaint because we thought
the defendants would use the new filing to demand new discovery, seek new
expert reports, file a new motion to dismiss, and delay the trial to the point
where our class could dissipate. We also worried that delay would lead to
another hunger strike and that some named plaintiffs and class members might
die. But after sharing our concerns, several plaintiffs strongly insisted we file a
supplemental complaint to ensure that the transferred plaintiffs could
continue in the case. They felt that it was wrong to allow the CDCR to moot
claims simply by transferring prisoners to other SHUs where they were still
kept in solitary. When we polled our named plaintiffs by phone, they all
agreed.
We decided to follow the prisoners’ strategy and file a supplemental
complaint, but there was disagreement among the lawyers regarding how to
preserve the December 7 trial date. Eventually, the lawyers agreed to argue
that Judge Wilken should (1) bifurcate the claims; (2) try the original
allegations challenging incarceration at Pelican Bay on December 7; and (3) if
the plaintiffs prevailed, then try the supplemental claim that transfer to
another SHU continued the harm created by confinement at Pelican Bay.264
Judge Wilken accepted our supplemental complaint and agreed to bifurcate
the claims, hearing the original claim first.265 Judge Wilken’s decision forced
the defendants to recognize that they were unlikely to moot the plaintiffs’ class
claims. Moreover, it transformed the case from a challenge to solitary
confinement in one California prison to a case potentially affecting prisons
across the state.
These examples are representative of our participatory approach, which
ignored the distinction between client-controlled objectives and lawyer-driven
legal tactics. While some tactical decisions—such as how to write briefs and
draft motions—were almost entirely lawyer made, most important decisions
were made jointly. The California lawyers’ legal visits, and my phone calls
with the named plaintiffs and class members, often included discussions of
legal strategy and tactical decisions.
264. See Reply in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint

at 6 n.1, Ashker v. Governor of Cal., No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2015), ECF
No. 377.
265. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 262, at 13-14; Order Granting Motion, supra
note 261, at 11.
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Our view of participatory litigation is exemplified by a letter I wrote to
plaintiff and hunger strike leader Ron Dewberry, known as Sitawa Nantambu
Jamaa. I explained that
it would be incorrect and politically reactionary to do this case without input,
guidance and leadership from prisoners like yourself. . . . Of course, we lawyers
have particular skills and expertise to bring to this situation, but I would
appreciate any comments, suggestions, modifications etc. you might have on the
draft complaint, and on our entire legal strategy. We might not agree, and we
would have to hash it out and discuss it, but we want your input.266

The letter was an immediate response to a letter from Sitawa seeking to
ensure that he and other plaintiffs were included in key decisionmaking in the
developing case. Because we were amending a pro se complaint brought by two
white plaintiffs, and our initial contact with the prisoners thus focused more
on those plaintiffs, Sitawa was concerned that other plaintiffs, particularly
Black plaintiffs, would either be left out or given a subsidiary role in the
ensuing class action. Part of my letter explained why our initial contact was
with the two white plaintiffs and what we would do in the near future to
rectify that unbalanced situation. I also apologized for the situation and
immediately sought a court order allowing phone calls with all of the named
plaintiffs. Sitawa was a revolutionary leader who demanded an important role,
and he was intent on not being subservient or deferential to the lawyers. The
interchange was a crucial moment of trust building with our key plaintiffs. Its
import was in recognizing Sitawa and the other plaintiffs’ leadership, not just
of the hunger strike, but also in the case itself. My letter signaled to Sitawa that
I and other CCR lawyers were not the typical class-action attorneys he had
encountered in prior cases, but that we viewed the litigation as a partnership
between the lawyers and prisoners and encouraged joint decisionmaking on
important legal matters.
F. Settlement Negotiations: Empowering the Collective
Both the traditional lawyering model and the client-centered model focus
on “enhancing the autonomy of the client.”267 The traditional model protects
client autonomy by positing a largely passive client who sets the overall
parameters and goals of the representation and then yields, and the clientcentered approach requires the lawyer to actively learn from the client and
involve the client in problem-solving.268
266. Letter from author to Sitawa Nantambu Jamaa 1 (Apr. 24, 2012) (on file with author).
267. Simon, supra note 242, at 1102. As Simon notes, “the client ‘empowerment’

recommended by the new [poverty law] scholarship seems quite similar to the client
autonomy exalted in the traditional doctrine.” Id. at 1104.
268. Berger, supra note 239, at 1092.
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The traditional and client-centered models emphasize individual
empowerment. Our goal was fundamentally different: to empower the
prisoners in their collective capacity. Both the lawyers and the plaintiffs wanted
the litigation to aid in building the prisoners’ human rights movement and
facilitate group dialogue and decisionmaking. We viewed the litigation as
providing a collective First Amendment right, similar to a union’s right to
collectively bargain and strike or a citizen’s right to demonstrate.269 Litigation
can be a form of “cooperative, organizational activity,”270 falling within the
First Amendment’s ambit of the “freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas.”271
California officials viewed collective action, such as the hunger strike or
the prisoners’ Agreement to End Hostilities, as a threat to their control over
California’s prisons. The Supreme Court has generally permitted prison
officials to bar organizing that is protected in other contexts: Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., in which the Court equated collective
organizing with the potential for prison disruption, illustrates the Court’s
deference to officials in this regard.272 Litigation is therefore one of the few
opportunities that prisoners have to engage in protected collective resistance.
The first real opportunity to effectuate our collective, participatory
approach came when Judge Wilken ordered mediation before Magistrate
Judge Vadas. We requested a meeting with all of the named plaintiffs to discuss
our negotiating position in the mediation. The CDCR lawyers strenuously
objected, saying that such a meeting was impossible and unprecedented and
suggesting that we discuss our negotiating demands individually with each
prisoner.
We argued that the plaintiffs needed to discuss the demands and approach
with one another, not solely with us. Magistrate Judge Vadas agreed, and he
ordered the defendants to arrange for an in-person meeting between lawyers
and all of the plaintiffs at Pelican Bay.
On June 12, 2013, co-counsel Anne Weills and I went to Pelican Bay for an
extraordinary and unprecedented three-hour meeting with all of the named
plaintiffs. Anne and I were greeted at the prison by about twenty correctional
officials, and we were escorted to a large room with glass windows. All of the
prisoners were placed in individual cages that looked like old telephone
booths, with glass and wire mesh doors so that they could see and hear each
other. Anne and I sat at a large table in the front facing the prisoners, and we
269. See Lynd, supra note 31, at 1422-35.
270. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 n.32 (1978) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430

(1963)).
271. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)).
272. 433 U.S. 119, 132-33 (1977).
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initiated a discussion based on a tentative list of demands the lawyers had
drawn up in individual discussions with the plaintiffs.
The discussion was lively and respectful, with all ten plaintiffs
participating and discussing their views. Our main role was facilitative: We
asked clarifying questions, took notes, and moved the meeting forward. By the
end, the plaintiffs had agreed on several new demands and modified some of
the demands in the initial list. I later quipped to my law school colleagues that
the meeting was more civil, respectful, and useful than many faculty meetings.
Anne and I stressed that we would not enter into a settlement agreement unless
the plaintiff representatives agreed on the terms at a follow-up meeting. At the
end of the discussion, to commemorate the remarkable achievement of
meeting collectively to discuss strategy and demands—albeit in draconian
conditions—we participated in a minute of silence.
The prisoners’ basic demands were that (1) the CDCR end indeterminate
confinement in the SHU; (2) future SHU terms be imposed for no more than
five years and for serious, proven misconduct, not gang affiliation; and (3) the
CDCR develop an innovative pilot program, termed a Management Control
Unit, to gradually transition SHU prisoners to GP. The plaintiffs also requested
that the Agreement to End Hostilities be “posted in all of California prisons[’]
bulletin boards and be sent to every inmate under the control of CDCR.”273
Magistrate Judge Vadas allowed two plaintiff representatives to attend the
mediation held at Pelican Bay on June 19, 2013. Unfortunately, the mediation
session proved to be a waste of time, as the CDCR and the Attorney General’s
Office were intransigent, did not negotiate, and violated the court’s order by
not sending someone with the authority to settle.
Several weeks later the prisoners commenced their July 8 hunger strike,
and in an effort to end the hunger strike on somewhat favorable terms, the
lawyers and plaintiffs agreed to submit a partial settlement proposal of our
Fourteenth Amendment due process claims. The CDCR rejected our proposal,
stating that they sought a global resolution of the entire case.
Magistrate Judge Vadas also wanted a global settlement, and after the
hunger strike ended he ordered the plaintiffs to draft a comprehensive
settlement proposal. We requested another meeting with plaintiffs, which
Magistrate Judge Vadas granted.
In December 2013, Anne and I once again met with the named plaintiffs in
the same setting. This time, perhaps to emphasize just how dangerous these
prisoners were, the prison officials made us don full flak jackets as if we were
going into a war zone. Such symbolic protection was ridiculous given that the
plaintiffs were locked in individual cages, the prisoners had been searched for
273. For the language of all of the demands, see Letter from Anne Weills, Att’y for the

Plaintiffs, to Mag. J. Nador J. Vadas 1-2 (June 13, 2013) (on file with author).
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weapons, and we were not afraid of the prisoners attacking us. But the prison
officials overruled our objections. Wearing these preposterous outfits, Anne
and I marched into the meeting room.
We spent the three-hour meeting discussing a draft settlement proposal
that the lawyers (in consultation with the plaintiffs) had sent out to everyone.
While Anne and I formally facilitated the meeting, plaintiff Gabriel Reyes led
the discussion, which went through the terms point by point and solicited
comments and disagreements. Again, the discussion was lively, respectful, and
engaged, and by the end we had consensus on a comprehensive proposal. The
main difference from our earlier proposal involved fleshing out what was now
termed a Modified General Population Program, to which the long-termers in
the SHU would be transferred for a six-month transition period. After this
period, absent serious misconduct, the prisoners would be placed in GP.
We submitted our settlement proposal on December 24, 2013, but the
defendants found our proposal unacceptable and settlement negotiations
appeared dead. Or so we thought.
In March 2015, we served the defendants with our ten expert reports,
which demonstrated that prolonged solitary confinement at Pelican Bay
caused the prisoners serious psychological and physical harm, deprived them
of social interaction (a basic human need), was unnecessary and
counterproductive penologically, and violated international norms and
practices.274 Those expert reports, combined with Judge Wilken’s allowance of
a supplemental complaint, apparently pushed the CDCR’s officials toward
settlement. At the beginning of April, CDCR Undersecretary Scott Kernan
called me to begin negotiations.
Kernan and CDCR Secretary Jeffrey Beard proved serious and told us that
they would present a detailed proposal. We agreed to negotiate, but we
demanded that the CDCR arrange for subsequent meetings between all of the
named plaintiffs and the legal team to discuss and respond to proposals. By that
point the plaintiffs were scattered at different prisons across the state, so the
lawyers and plaintiffs agreed to telephonic conferences.
Moreover, because we viewed ourselves as representing the prisoners’
movement and not merely a class of prisoners,275 we demanded that Arturo
Castellanos be included on the conference calls. Such a demand was
unorthodox because Castellanos, who was not a named plaintiff, had no legal
standing to participate in these discussions. But Castellanos was one of the four
main leaders of the hunger strikes and the prisoners’ human rights movement,
and his participation was critical to negotiating a settlement which would
garner widespread support among the prisoners.
274. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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The CDCR agreed to our procedural demands. Over the next few months,
Carol Strickman, a lawyer closely associated with the hunger strikes, and I
negotiated with the CDCR by phone and brought the resulting proposals back
to the prisoner phone conference. After each round of negotiations, the named
plaintiffs and Castellanos went over the proposals point by point, discussed
them, and presented their alternatives and modifications to negotiate with
Beard and Kernan. The lawyers and plaintiffs participated as equals in these
discussions, with the lawyers generally facilitating, the plaintiffs and
Castellanos raising substantive points, and everyone working out
disagreements to develop our negotiating position.
After three months of negotiating, a final agreement was ready for
collective discussion and a ratification vote by the named plaintiffs. It provided
that the CDCR would (1) end indeterminate SHU placement based on alleged
gang affiliation; (2) limit future SHU placement to a determinate term imposed
after the prisoner was found guilty in a disciplinary hearing that comported
with Wolff due process protections as set forth in the CDCR rules;276 (3) release
all class members without a recent conviction for serious misconduct from the
SHU to GP (it turned out that almost none of the 1,500 class members had such
a conviction); (4) apply the settlement to all CDCR SHUs systemwide; and
(5) create a new unit, the Restrictive Custody General Population (RCGP)
Housing Unit, as a transitional GP unit for prisoners not released to GP under
the agreement and those with safety concerns precluding such release.277 The
agreement included monitoring for two years and enforcement before
Magistrate Judge Vadas, with a de novo appeal to Judge Wilken.278
We also negotiated for the plaintiffs to play a direct role in monitoring,
including (1) an annual meeting between the plaintiffs and lawyers; (2) a
semiannual meeting between four prisoner representatives and the defendants
to discuss the implementation of the agreement; and (3) a meeting between
four prisoner representatives and CDCR experts evaluating the SDP.279 The
agreement almost broke down when the CDCR adamantly refused to accept
these participatory provisions, but Magistrate Judge Vadas ultimately resolved
the dispute in our favor (although he reduced the frequency of the meetings).
The final stage in the settlement process was a ratification call with all of
the named plaintiffs. We had already had a conference call with the four key
leaders who formed a de facto prisoner executive committee—Sitawa, Ashker,
276. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 257, ¶¶ 13-17. We therefore won on the point

that Edward Dumbrique had raised in his initial memorandum. See supra notes 250-51
and accompanying text.
277. Settlement Agreement, supra note 257, ¶¶ 13-17, 25-28.
278. Id. ¶¶ 37, 48-50, 52-53.
279. Id. ¶¶ 21, 40, 49.
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Castellanos and Franco—and they had given their approval to move the
settlement forward (although Sitawa was somewhat tentative). But tensions
and disagreements among the prisoners had begun to emerge.
In conversations with plaintiffs before the ratification call, several raised
significant concerns. First, we had served the defendants with a strong motion
for summary judgment on our due process claim at the beginning of July. Some
prisoners got cold feet after reading the motion, feeling that we should not
settle until Judge Wilken decided the due process claim. The summary
judgment motion asked for prisoners’ gang validations to be expunged from
their records—a prospect that many plaintiffs found exciting—but this relief
was not in the settlement. Some prisoners also felt that we should get an
explicit acknowledgment of the CDCR’s constitutional violations and the
harm that they had suffered over the years. The agreement did not provide
such an explicit acknowledgment, but a judicial victory would. One named
plaintiff did not attend the final ratification meeting and did not sign the
agreement. Gabriel Reyes expressed to me what others may have felt, saying
that while he respected me as a lawyer, he thought I was too reasonable a
negotiator and that we could have gotten even more in the settlement. In
retrospect, perhaps he was right.
Second, some prisoners and lawyers felt that the negotiation process had
been very rushed. Both sides were negotiating against the backdrop of a
December 7 trial date, which we were adamant about preserving. Maintaining
that date kept pressure on the defendants, who would have to face a trial in just
a few months if the settlement talks broke down. In retrospect, however, while
the time pressure pushed the settlement process forward, it also led to us not
fully considering some of the settlement’s difficulties and problems.
At the ratification meeting, the legal team recommended that we accept
the final settlement but emphasized that the decision of whether to settle was
the plaintiffs’ alone. Ashker spoke brilliantly and forcefully in favor of
settlement, arguing that the Prison Litigation Reform Act limited what we
could get as relief even with a courtroom victory.280 After much discussion,
each plaintiff stated his vote and the reasons behind it. One by one they each
voted to settle, stating that the agreement was the best we could get, that we
had come a long way, that it allowed us to maintain unity, and that they were
thankful for everyone’s participation.

280. The Prison Litigation Reform Act attempts to limit the relief that prisoners can obtain

even after proving constitutional violations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e; 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)
(“The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that
such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right.”).
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At the very end it was Sitawa’s turn, and he expressed his conflicting
feelings. Sitawa was a principled, revolutionary Black leader who commanded
tremendous respect among the prisoners. He was housed near several Black
prisoners who undoubtedly did not support the agreement. Sitawa said that he
did not like the agreement because it treated gang-validated prisoners as
second-class citizens, imposing additional punishment if they committed a
serious disciplinary violation. He was right, and in retrospect we should not
have agreed to that point, but the CDCR was insistent on retaining the SDP.
Tensions caused by mostly white attorneys representing a class of mostly
minority plaintiffs were simmering below the surface. Sitawa had mentioned
several times to me over the course of the litigation that he would appreciate
the inclusion of Black attorneys on our team. We somewhat rectified the
situation by adding new lawyers of color, but visits and phone calls with white
lawyers still constituted the bulk of the plaintiffs’ contacts with our team The
lawyers had worked hard to maintain racial unity and win the trust of the
prisoners by treating everyone with dignity and respect. But the Black
plaintiffs came from a radical Black-nationalist background, and it was
unlikely that their representation by primarily white lawyers did not in some
way affect their outlook.
Nonetheless, Sitawa concluded by saying that he would vote for the
settlement agreement for the sake of unity. He was an incredible statesman,
and he said that everyone had given something up. But he wanted to be sure
that we enforced the agreement to its fullest extent. Sitawa later told me that
he had spoken with Danny Troxell, a white named plaintiff who was housed
nearby, and that Troxell had asked him not to torpedo the agreement. Sitawa
spoke last because he did not want to influence others’ votes, and in the end he
chose to support the group, albeit with qualms. Sitawa’s actions both reflect his
ability as a leader and shed light on how the prisoners were able to overcome
their own differences, interests, and conflicts to act in a unified manner during
the hunger strikes and the litigation. The prisoners’ and lawyers’ collective
decisionmaking required mutual respect, listening to one another, and placing
a high value on unity—even if doing so meant submerging individual views. It
was a learning experience for all of us, particularly the lawyers.
After the vote, the plaintiffs decided on a statement representing their
view of the settlement:
This settlement represents a monumental victory for prisoners and an important
step toward our goal of ending solitary confinement in California, and across the
country. California’s agreement to abandon indeterminate SHU confinement
based on gang affiliation demonstrates the power of unity and collective action.
This victory was achieved by the efforts of people in prison, their families and
loved ones, lawyers, and outside supporters. Our movement rests on a foundation
of unity: our Agreement to End Hostilities. It is our hope that this
groundbreaking agreement to end the violence between the various ethnic
groups in California prisons will inspire not only state prisoners, but also jail
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detainees, county prisoners and our communities on the street, to oppose ethnic
and racial violence. From this foundation, the prisoners’ human rights movement
is awakening the conscience of the nation to recognize that we are fellow human
beings. As the recent statements of President Obama and of Justice Kennedy
illustrate, the nation is turning against solitary confinement. We celebrate this
victory while, at the same time, we recognize that achieving our goal of
fundamentally transforming the criminal justice system and stopping the
practice of warehousing people in prison will be a protracted struggle. We are
fully committed to that effort, and invite you to join us.281

On September 1, 2015, the parties announced the settlement agreement,
which received general acclaim in the press. A New York Times editorial
proclaimed that “the slow push for meaningful reform [of solitary
confinement] got a big shove in the right direction,” arguing that the
“importance of California’s settlement” was that it demonstrated that “broad
reform is surely possible around the country.”282 The lengthy story covering
the settlement in the Times ended with an extensive quote from the plaintiffs’
statement.283 The San Jose Mercury News quoted Sitawa’s sister, who termed the
settlement a “monumental leap,” and Dolores Canales, the head of CFASC
(California Families Against Solitary Confinement), who noted that “[t]his legal
victory is huge, but it is not the end of our fight.”284
The prisoners’ collective victory increased their sense of solidarity. As
William Simon has perceptively written, the “experience of confronting their
adversary together in circumstances where he was obliged to acknowledge
them as a group and as other than subordinates and to account to them in some
minimal way . . . empowered them in relation to the adversary.”285 But as
Canales and the class representatives recognized, the fight was far from over.
Enforcement of the settlement agreement would be a long, arduous, and often
frustrating experience.

281. Todd Ashker, Sitawa Nantambu Jamaa, Luis Esquivel, George Franco, Richard

282.
283.
284.
285.

Johnson, Paul Redd, Gabriel Reyes, George Ruiz & Danny Troxell, Statement of
Plaintiffs on Settlement of Ashker v. Governor of California, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (Aug. 31,
2015), https://perma.cc/9RT9-CS5G.
Editorial, Solitary Confinement Is Cruel and All Too Common, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2015),
https://perma.cc/PU88-ZLST.
Ian Lovett, California Agrees to Overhaul Use of Solitary Confinement, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1,
2015), https://perma.cc/XVA4-LRMK.
Howard Mintz, California Prison Abuse Case: Solitary Confinement Policy Softened,
MERCURY NEWS (updated Aug. 12, 2016, 1:17 AM), https://perma.cc/4H5W-RRSE.
Simon, supra note 69, at 483-84.
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G. Participatory Enforcement and Monitoring
The class-action model of legal liberalism often blinds lawyers to the
difficulties, obstacles, and problems of monitoring and enforcement.286
Participation by class representatives and members is particularly important in
the implementation phase of structural-reform litigation, as often the
plaintiffs understand problems and possible solutions far better than the
lawyers involved. This insight is not limited to litigation: It has also been
applied to implementing government policies more generally. As Paul Farmer,
a professor of medicine at Harvard and co-founder of the organization Partners
in Health, noted about the participatory process of his work in Haiti, which he
termed “accompaniment”: “[T]he great failures of policy and governance
usually occur because of failures of implementation, and accompaniment is
good insurance against such failures.”287
Accompaniment, as defined by Farmer and practiced by liberation
theologians and lawyers such as Alice and Staughton Lynd, requires
professionals to journey together as equals with and learn from the people who
they seek to aid.288 As Farmer notes, accompaniment is particularly critical in
the implementation phase of any reform.289
Similarly, William Simon suggested years ago that perhaps the most
promising development in class-action participation was not the “notice and
intervention provisions on which conflicts doctrine has focused, but the
remedial provisions that give class members a direct role in monitoring the
decree.”290 Our goal was to incorporate plaintiff participation into the
monitoring and implementation of the settlement agreement.
Judge Wilken approved the settlement agreement on January 26, 2016,
calling it “remarkable . . . . [I]t is extremely fair, extremely humane, and
286. Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 639,

712-13 (1993); see also Bell, supra note 57, at 513-14.
287. Paul Farmer, Kolokotrones Univ. Professor of Glob. Health & Soc. Med., Harvard

Univ., Commencement Address at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University: Accompaniment as Policy (May 25, 2011), https://perma.cc/CP9J-KA34.
288. Id.; see also LYND, supra note 25, at 5; LYND & LYND, supra note 25, at 4-5.
289. Farmer, supra note 287.
290. Simon, supra note 69, at 487; see also Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401, 429 (1st Cir.
1976) (describing the role of community groups in monitoring and implementing a
school-desegregation decree); Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 686-88
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (directing the parties to obtain community input under the guidance of
a facilitator in order to develop reforms for the New York City Police Department);
Sabel & Simon, supra note 32, at 1032 (discussing a court-approved compliance plan
providing for plaintiff and expert input into proposed policies and initiatives at a
mental institution); Yaroshefsky, supra note 18, at 3 (describing movement lawyering
in the Floyd case and how clients convened a two-day long community meeting to
discuss proposed remedies).

142

Participatory Litigation
74 STAN. L. REV. 87 (2022)

extremely innovative.”291 Twelve class members (out of twenty-five total), or
about 1.5% of the affected class of prisoners, sent the court objections.292 Judge
Wilken held that no objection cast doubt on the fairness of the settlement,293
although in one important matter involving the newly created RCGP unit, she
agreed with the objectors and suggested a needed modification.294 We did more
than the defendants wanted to ensure adequate class notification, not simply
posting the agreement in all prisons but also translating it into Spanish and
distributing a copy to every class member at Pelican Bay.295
By fall 2016, the CDCR had transferred virtually all prisoners in
indeterminate SHUs around the state into GP. The few not transferred were
placed in the RCGP due to safety concerns or disciplinary misconduct.
Pursuant to an oral agreement with Secretary Beard, the disciplinary
misconduct that many class members had received for their participation in
the hunger strikes was ignored during the CDCR’s review process. The CDCR
believed that they had substantially complied with the settlement agreement
and were awaiting the two-year mark to terminate the case. Magistrate Judge
Vadas appeared to agree with the defendants, and indeed rejected every
enforcement motion that we made while he was in charge of monitoring the
agreement.296
We disagreed with the CDCR and Magistrate Judge Vadas. We promised
the plaintiffs that we would enforce the agreement to its fullest, and the
plaintiffs believed the defendants were violating many of the agreement’s
291. Reporter’s Transcript of Fairness Hearing & Motion Hearing at 6, Ashker v. Brown,

292.

293.
294.

295.

296.

No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2016), ECF No. 493 [hereinafter Transcript of
Fairness Hearing].
Notice of Joint Motion & Motion for Final Approval of Settlement Agreement at 1-2,
9-10, Ashker v. Governor of Cal., No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2016), ECF No. 485
[hereinafter Motion for Final Approval].
Transcript of Fairness Hearing, supra note 291, at 4-5.
Judge Wilken agreed with objections arguing that since prisoners transferred to the
RCGP for safety concerns had committed no misconduct, they should get the same
number of contact visits as prisoners in typical GP units. We had, in retrospect,
mistakenly agreed to far fewer contact visits for those placed in the RCGP, and we
eagerly agreed with Judge Wilken. The defendants agreed to negotiate further on this
issue. Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings at 8-9, Ashker v. Governor of Cal., No. 09cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2015), ECF No. 477. It took almost a year to negotiate a
better, but still unequal and unsatisfactory, arrangement for contact visits at the RCGP.
See Motion for Final Approval, supra note 292, at 1-2. Fortunately, early on in the
litigation, the firm Weil, Gotshal & Manges agreed to become co-counsel and to share
expenses with the CCR so that we could afford the litigation.
Judge Wilken reversed Magistrate Judge Vadas’s ruling with respect to one of the
enforcement motions. See Order Regarding Plaintiffs’ Motion for De Novo
Determination of Dispositive Matter Referred to Magistrate Judge Regarding
Production of Documents Required by Settlement Agreement at 1-5, Ashker v.
Governor of Cal., No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2018), ECF No. 970.
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provisions. For example, the settlement agreement provided that the CDCR
would train staff to prevent the misuse of confidential information and ensure
that the information used against prisoners was accurate.297 But misuse
continued,298 and while several enforcement motions were unsuccessful, a
careful review of redacted copies of confidential memoranda demonstrated
that the CDCR was systemically misusing and misreporting confidential
information. We filed an omnibus motion seeking extension of the settlement
agreement, claiming, among other things, that the CDCR’s misuse violated
procedural due process.299 This time, Magistrate Judge Illman, who had
replaced Magistrate Judge Vadas, ruled in our favor, granting the extension
and holding that the CDCR was continuing to violate the constitutional rights
of our class members.300 The defendants appealed that decision to the Ninth
Circuit, which dismissed the appeal on jurisdictional grounds and remanded to
Judge Wilken.301
Many of the innovative features of the settlement have been negated by
the CDCR. For example, the RCGP, the new, innovative unit provided for by
the settlement—a feature that the prisoners had fought for,302 and I had
extolled in speeches and articles—was turned into a unit that replicated some
aspects of the SHU. Almost half of the prisoners confined there were placed on
“walk-alone status,” in which they recreated alone, had no physical contact
with other prisoners, had no group activities, and were essentially put in a new
form of solitary confinement.303 Moreover, what was foreseen as a transitional
297. Settlement Agreement, supra note 257, ¶ 34.
298. Numerous named plaintiffs and class members had informed us that the debriefing

299.

300.

301.
302.
303.

system and the CDCR’s misuse of informant information was at the heart of their
control of the prisoners.
See Motion for Extension of Settlement Agreement Based on Systemic Due Process
Violations at 3-4, Ashker v. Governor of Cal., No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2017),
ECF No. 905 [hereinafter Motion for Extension].
Ashker v. Newsom, No. 09-cv-05796, 2019 WL 330461, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2019)
(finding that the CDCR’s use of confidential information to place people in the SHU
systemically violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), appeal
dismissed, 968 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2020).
Ashker v. Newsom, 968 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2020).
The RCGP was the name that the CDCR gave to what the prisoners proposed as a
Modified General Population Unit in their December 2013 settlement proposal.
We challenged walk-alone status as being clearly violative of the settlement agreement
because it was not the “small group” recreation that the agreement required. Settlement
Agreement, supra note 257, ¶ 28. We lost before Magistrate Judge Illman, appealed to
Judge Wilken, who ruled in our favor, and then lost when a Ninth Circuit panel
reversed Judge Wilken’s decision. Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Enforcement Motion
Regarding RCGP Prisoners on Walk-Alone Status at 7-8, Ashker v. Cate, No. 09-cv05796 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2018), ECF No. 987; Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion
Regarding Violation of Settlement Agreement Provision Regarding RCGP Prisoners
on Walk-Alone Status at 1, Ashker v. Governor of Cal., No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal.
footnote continued on next page
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unit for a few prisoners had morphed into a permanent placement for many
prisoners with no way out. Our extension motion challenged the RCGP as
constituting deprivation of a liberty interest and argued that placement and
retention in the RCGP violated due process.304 We won on the former point,
but lost on the latter before Magistrate Judge Illman.305
After the Ninth Circuit’s remand, both parties appealed Magistrate Judge
Illman’s extension ruling to Judge Wilken. In a lengthy April 2021 decision,
Judge Wilken affirmed Magistrate Judge Illman’s ruling regarding liberty
interests and reversed his holding that the placement and retention of
prisoners in the RCGP did not violate due process.306 Judge Wilken also found
that the defendants were engaged in ongoing, systemic constitutional
violations in their misuse of confidential information.307 Judge Wilken
ultimately granted a settlement extension, and the defendants have once again
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.308
The CDCR also undermined the innovative provisions requiring prisoner
participation in monitoring the settlement. The four representatives did have a
productive meeting with the experts the CDCR brought in to evaluate the
SDP, and the experts listened to the representatives and expressed some
support for the plaintiffs’ views on the program (including that it should not
be used in conjunction with disciplinary confinement in the SHU going
forward). The CDCR did not, however, discard the SDP. The semiannual
meetings between the defendants and the four representatives that we had
fought so hard to incorporate into the settlement agreement did occur, but the
CDCR refused to engage in any meaningful dialogue with the representatives.
The CDCR was willing to release these gang-validated prisoners to GP, yet
they still would not recognize them as having valuable insights. Instead, the
CDCR saw the plaintiffs as dangerous gangsters: people to be tolerated but not
listened to.
The most important breakthrough in plaintiff participation during the
monitoring period came in the context of an issue that the CDCR officials
absolutely refused to discuss. After the CDCR transferred almost all class
members to GP prisons, the lawyers and plaintiff representatives began to

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

July 3, 2018), ECF No. 1029; Ashker v. Newsom, 968 F.3d 939, 942-44, 946 (9th Cir.
2020).
Motion for Extension, supra note 299, at 31-47.
Ashker, 2019 WL 330461, at *13.
Order Extending the Settlement Agreement at 24, 31, Ashker v. Newsom, No. 09-cv05796 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2021), ECF No. 1440.
Id. at 48; see also id. at 55 (finding that the CDCR’s transmission of old gang validations
to the Board of Parole Hearings was a systemic constitutional violation).
Id. at 56; Defendants’ Notice of Appeal, Ashker v. Governor of Cal., No. 09-cv-05796
(N.D. Cal. May 7, 2021), ECF No. 1456.
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receive complaints that GP in some maximum-security prisons was akin to
solitary confinement, particularly with respect to out-of-cell time.309 When
the representatives attempted to discuss this issue at the semiannual meeting,
the CDCR simply refused, saying that it was outside the scope of the settlement
agreement. The legal team asked class members to complete daily activity logs;
fifty-five prisoners returned these logs, and the conclusions were startling.310
Almost a third of the respondents reported receiving less than one hour per
day of out-of-cell time, less than they had received in the SHU.311
We filed an enforcement motion claiming that in reality these prisoners
had not been transferred to GP, but instead were being forced to continue in
segregated, SHU-like conditions in derogation of the settlement agreement.312
Magistrate Judge Illman ruled against us,313 but Judge Wilken reversed this
decision, reading the agreement to require that the defendants transfer the
plaintiffs to new facilities that provided at least as much out-of-cell time as
they had in the SHU.314 Judge Wilken ordered the parties to meet and confer
before Magistrate Judge Illman to discuss a remedy.
We decided that the lawyers would not meet alone with Magistrate Judge
Illman and the defense counsel, but instead requested that Magistrate Judge
Illman grant writs of habeas corpus to bring all four plaintiff representatives
from their prison cells to the San Francisco Federal Courthouse to participate.
Judge Illman granted the habeas writs,315 and on August 21, 2018, a
309. See Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Answering Brief on Appeal at 8-9, Ashker v. Newsom, 968 F.3d
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312.
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939 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 18-16427), ECF No. 41. The critical factor in determining
whether prisoners are housed in solitary confinement is the amount of time they spend
outside of their cells. Id. at 26 (noting that the Department of Justice defines solitary
confinement as being confined in one’s cell for twenty-two or more hours a day);
ASCA–LITMAN SURVEY, supra note 17, at 2 (defining restrictive housing by out-of-cell
time); see also Judith Resnik, Not Isolating Isolation, in PROLONGED SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT: EFFECTS, PRACTICES, AND PATHWAYS TOWARD REFORM 89, 112 (Jules
Lobel & Peter Scharff Smith eds., 2020).
Plaintiffs’ Enforcement Motion Regarding Violation of Settlement Agreement
Provision Requiring Release of Class Members to General Population at 1-2, Ashker v.
Governor of Cal., No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2017), ECF No. 849 [hereinafter
Plaintiffs’ Enforcement Motion]; Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Answering Brief on Appeal,
supra note 309, at 8-10.
Plaintiffs’ Enforcement Motion, supra note 310, at 1-7, 9.
Id. at 1.
Order re Plaintiffs’ Motion Regarding Settlement Agreement Provision Requiring
Release of Class Members to General Population at 5, Ashker v. Brown, No. 09-cv05796 (N.D. Cal. March 29, 2018), ECF No. 986.
See Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion Regarding Violation of Settlement Agreement
Provision Requiring Release of Class Members to General Population at 2, Ashker v.
Governor of Cal., No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2018), ECF No. 1028.
See Order and Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum, Ashker v. Brown, No. 09-cv05796 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2018), ECF No. 1067; Order and Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad
footnote continued on next page
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multivehicle motorcade, with sirens blaring and police escorts clearing the
streets, drove the four plaintiff representatives from San Quentin Prison,
where they had been in holding cells, to the federal courthouse in downtown
San Francisco. At approximately 9:30 AM that morning, the four plaintiffs
walked into the courtroom shackled and in prison garb, closely guarded by U.S.
Marshals. The lawyers were sitting around a table, and the prisoners sat down
next to us, with the entire perimeter of the courtroom surrounded by
approximately twenty-five armed U.S. Marshals, presumably to protect the
lawyers and the judge from violent attacks by the plaintiffs.
At an earlier conference call with the four plaintiff representatives, we all
agreed that the lawyers would serve only as facilitators during the conference.
The four representatives would make substantive presentations. After my
introduction, each representative presented a short analysis of a different
problem facing the plaintiffs in GP—a small amount of out-of-cell time, a lack
of prison jobs, few educational opportunities, no rehabilitative programming—
and a proposed remedy. The remedies were pragmatic, fairly simple, and
achievable: restoring group meals in unused prison cafeterias instead of serving
meals individually in cells; having prisoners apprentice and learn plumbing so
that plumbing backups and problems would not await CDCR repairs for
months; and having prisoners run group and educational programming. Both
the defense counsel and Magistrate Judge Illman asked some questions, and
after more than three hours the prisoners were returned to San Quentin for
transfer back to their prisons.
Not much ever came of this session. The CDCR made a few minor changes
to the maximum-security GP prisons, appealed Judge Wilken’s order, and
eventually won reversal at the Ninth Circuit.316 We had lost in court, but the
political mobilization surrounding our courtroom effort, the recognition our
effort received,317 and the achievement of forcing the defendants to meet with
the plaintiff representatives in open court to discuss remedying the abysmal
Testificandum, Ashker v. Brown, No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2018), ECF
No. 1046; Order and Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum, Ashker v. Brown,
No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2018), ECF No. 1047; Order and Writ of Habeas
Corpus Ad Testificandum, Ashker v. Brown, No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2018),
ECF No. 1048.
316. Ashker v. Newsom, 968 F.3d 939, 942 (9th Cir. 2020). After the Ninth Circuit decision,
the four plaintiff representatives urged us to petition for en banc appeal, which we
agreed to do. The petition was denied. See Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing
En Banc at 18, Ashker v. Newsom, No. 18-16427 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2020), ECF No. 79;
Order at 1, Ashker v. Newsom, No. 18-16427 (9th Cir. Oct 14, 2020), ECF No. 80.
317. The recognition included an amicus brief in the Ninth Circuit filed by prominent
former high-level prison officials supporting our position. Brief of Amici Curaie
Former Correctional Officials in Support of Affirmance at 1-4, Ashker, 968 F.3d 939
(No. 18-16427), ECF No. 48.
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conditions in maximum-security California prisons made the effort successful
from a long-term, political perspective.
More than five years after the settlement agreement was signed, the
implementation struggle continues. After Magistrate Judge Illman’s ruling
granting a one-year settlement extension,318 the defendants sought a stay of
the extension and the agreement’s monitoring provisions pending appeal.
Judge Wilken denied the stay, and her denial was affirmed by the Ninth
Circuit.319 We therefore conducted another year of monitoring during the
pendency of the first appeal. Based on our review of documents from the
additional year, we have filed a new motion seeking a second yearlong
extension.320 Judge Wilken is now determining whether to grant our motion
while the order affirming the first extension is on appeal.321
As often happens in reform movements, successes in court diminished the
prisoners’ struggle. The injustice of indeterminate solitary confinement that
united them is now gone, although other injustices remain. The prisoner
leadership has been scattered throughout many CDCR prisons, and the only
real means for the four key representatives to communicate is through our
legal meetings.
The threat that the prisoners’ legal and political victory will come undone
in future years continues unabated. The powerful California Correctional
Peace Officers Association sought unsuccessfully to intervene in our case fairly
soon after we filed the Second Amended Complaint,322 and later filed an
318. See supra note 300 and accompanying text. The settlement agreement only allows for
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extensions in one-year intervals, after which a new motion for extension is required
based on evidence of ongoing constitutional violations. Settlement Agreement, supra
note 257, ¶¶ 41, 43.
Order Granting Motion for De Novo Determination of Ruling Regarding District
Court’s Jurisdiction Pending Appeal & Motion to Stay at 2, Ashker v. Newsom, No. 09cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2019), ECF No. 1198; Order at 2, Ashker v. Newsom,
No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2019), ECF No. 1212.
Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for Extension of Settlement Agreement Based on Systemic
Due Process Violations at 1-3, Ashker v. Governor of Cal., No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 25, 2020), ECF No. 1346-3. Magistrate Judge Illman filed a report and
recommendation concluding that the second extension motion should be denied, and
the plaintiffs have filed a de novo appeal with Judge Wilken. See Report and
Recommendation Re: Motion to Extend Settlement Agreement at 14, Ashker v. Cate,
No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 2021), ECF No. 1497; [Proposed] Order Granting
Plaintiffs’ Motion for De Novo Determination of Dispositive Ruling by Magistrate
Judge Regarding Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for Extension of Settlement Agreement
Based on Systemic Due Process Violations at 1, Ashker v. Governor of Cal., No. 09-cv05796 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2021), ECF No. 1507-1.
See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
Order Granting in Part Motion for Class Certification; Denying Motion to Intervene
at 1, 3, Ashker v. Governor of Cal., No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2014), ECF
No. 317.
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amicus brief objecting to the settlement agreement with the district court.323
While the CDCR’s policies have changed, it is unclear whether its culture and
staff attitudes have. Unfortunately, I have personally experienced the undoing
of momentous reforms. In Austin v. Wilkinson, we won a major victory in the
district court resulting in the release of around 80% of the prisoners subjected
to solitary confinement at the Ohio State Penitentiary.324 Yet “almost 20 years
later Ohio has changed its policies to undo much of what we seemingly had
accomplished by the Austin v. Wilkinson litigation.”325
My career has been defined by filing and quickly litigating political cases,
and then moving on to the next case after each one. The Pelican Bay case
constitutes a different experience for me, one in which the long process of
enforcement has proved challenging yet rewarding. We promised the
prisoners when we settled that we would stick with them to ensure that the
settlement agreement was fully implemented. Thus far we have kept our word.
III. Class Action, Impact Litigation, and Participatory Democracy
The Pelican Bay litigation illustrates both the dilemmas and the
transformative potential of grassroots participation in impact, class-action
litigation. Transformative change requires not only a radical restructuring of
our economic, social, and political institutions to eliminate the class, race,
ethnic, and gender inequalities that pervade American society, but also a
fundamental change in our understanding and practices of democracy,
representation, and expertise. Transforming the lawyering and litigation
process is one aspect of rediscovering the democratic tradition of active selfgovernment by engaged citizens.326
The insights and questions derived from the Pelican Bay litigation fall into
four main categories. First, the litigation embodies “acting with”
representation, a form of representation that is not typically explored in
academic scholarship or class-action lawyering. Second, the litigation raises a
general question about participatory tactics: Can the group participation and
collaborative class-action lawyering described in this Article be applied to
other injunctive class actions, or were the specific circumstances of these
plaintiffs anomalous? Third, the litigation demonstrates why participation is
323. Brief of Amici Curiae in Opposition to Settlement at 3-7, Ashker v. Governor of Cal.,

No. 09-cv-05796 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2016), ECF No. 487.
324. 189 F. Supp. 2d 719, 754 (N.D. Ohio 2002); Austin v. Wilkinson, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1024,

1026 (N.D. Ohio 2002); Email from Alice Lynd to author (January 31, 2021, 4:11 PM) (on
file with author).
325. Email from Alice Lynd to author, supra note 324.
326. See Piomelli, Democratic Roots, supra note 82, at 548; see also Guinier & Torres, supra
note 18, at 2743.
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not merely an abstract democratic value, but can instead play an essential role
in successfully litigating class-action cases. Finally, the Pelican Bay story
underscores the profound expertise of some plaintiffs, calling on lawyers to
transform the relationship between the layperson and the professional in
struggles to remake institutions and policies.
A. Theories of Political and Class-Action Representation
Fundamentally transforming American society requires rethinking deeply
ingrained views of representation. In any large society, democratic governance
requires some type of representation. In the United States, several views of
representation have competed since the nation’s founding.
The first theory of representation, against which the colonists rebelled,
was the British theory of virtual representation, in which the legislator
represented society’s interests and not that of a particular constituency. 327
Supporters claim that virtual representation results in legislators who are
more cosmopolitan, broad-minded, and willing to support needed legislation
without being tied to the views of any constituency.328 Yet it is clearly an
elitist, undemocratic mode of representation.
By contrast, early state constitutions fostered a descriptive, or actual,
theory of representation,329 in which the representative should resemble or
mirror his constituency. As John Adams put it, a representative legislature
“should think, feel, reason and act like [the people at large].”330 Under this
theory, constituents could mandate their representatives’ actions to guarantee
maximum popular input and control over legislation.331 In nascent state
governments, election districts were small, elections were held frequently, and
legislators had term limits.332 State representatives were typically from the

327. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, at 173-81
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(1969); WILLIAM SEAL CARPENTER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICAL
THOUGHT 46-47 (Howard Fertig, Inc. ed. 1968); Peter M. Shane, Reflections in Three
Mirrors: Complexities of Representation in a Constitutional Democracy, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 693,
700-01 (1999); Joseph Fishkin, Taking Virtual Representation Seriously, 59 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1681, 1690-92 (2018).
See Fishkin, supra note 327, at 1703 (describing the views of Edmund Burke).
See PITKIN, supra note 50, at 149.
Id. at 60 (quoting Letter from John Adams to John Penn (Jan. 1776), in 4 THE WORKS OF
JOHN ADAMS 203, 205 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1865)).
Id. at 149. See generally id. at 144-67 (discussing “mandate” representation, where
representatives must obey the wishes of their constituents, versus “independent”
representation, where representatives may vote according to their judgment).
See, e.g., PA. CONST. of 1776, §§ 8-9.
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same rural, less-educated background as their constituents,333 and it was
common practice for a group of constituents to agree on instructions that
expressly bound their representatives to vote in a particular fashion.334
The Framers’ theory of representation rejected both the descriptive,
mandate representation of state governments and the virtual representation of
England. Instead, the Framers favored consent and accountability. The states’
experiences with what some Framers termed the “inconveniences of
democracy,”335 or “the turbulence and follies of democracy,”336 led them to
structure a system in which they hoped “[t]he people . . . [would] have as little to
do as may be about the [g]overnment.”337 American democracy was thus
transformed from popular participation to accountability: Representatives had
larger constituencies and longer terms in office, and the consent of the people
came in the form of periodic elections and popular ratification of the
Constitution. Representation, in other words, moved from congruence of
interest to popular consent.338 The Framers’ conception of representation
maintained the accountability value of electoral democracy but eschewed
grassroots participation. As Benjamin Rush put it, although “all power is
derived from the people[,] they possess it only on the days of their elections.
After this, it is the property of their rulers.”339
The civil rights and the new left movements of the 1960s presented bold
critiques of this representational framework, renewing interest in
participatory democracy.340 In the legal arena, this critique of representation

333. See Gordon S. Wood, Democracy and the Constitution, in HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE

CONSTITUTION? 1, 12 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., 1980).
334. WOOD, supra note 327, at 189-90. The concept was not that the constituents petitioned

their representatives but rather that they instructed them. Id.
335. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 135 (Max. Farrand ed., rev. ed.

1966).
336. Id. at 51.
337. Id. at 48; see RICHARD. HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN

WHO MADE IT 4 (25th anniversary ed. 1973).
338. Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action, Part II: Interest, Class, and

Representation, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1067, 1072 (1980) (describing political representation as
“mov[ing] from interest to consent as its legitimizing basis”).
339. Carpenter, supra note 327, at 103 (quoting Benjamin Rush, Address to the People of the
United States (1787), in H. NILES, PRINCIPLES AND ACTS OF THE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA
402, 403 (Baltimore, William Ogden Niles 1822)). Madison opposed a proposed
amendment which would have enabled the people “to instruct their representatives.” 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 766-67 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
340. See Piomelli, Democratic Roots, supra note 82, at 548-50. See generally BENJAMIN R.
BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE (1984).
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led to a reconception of the lawyer–client relationship as collaborative,
nonhierarchical, and participatory.341
Impact litigation, whether the lawsuit is brought by a class, a movement
organization, or a group of plaintiffs, is in many respects akin to political
representation: The lawyer is representing a collective body and making
decisions on important legal and policy issues.342 Indeed, class-action
lawyering often resembles virtual representation, where the lawyer’s task is to
advocate for the class as a whole rather than the named representatives. 343
Scholars have long recognized the challenges of this dynamic,344 and it does
not help that the ethical rules make no major distinction between individual
and class representation.345
How do we address the problems occasioned by group representation?
David Luban has argued that lawyers should “adopt the most direct form of
representation possible under the circumstances,” acting on the wishes of the
class when it is small enough, the wishes of named representatives when the
class is sufficiently mobilized, and the wishes of “typical” lawyer-selected
plaintiffs when the class is unmobilized or prohibitively large.346 Only where
those representative models are impossible does Luban suggest undertaking
“best-world representation,” where the lawyer alone determines the best
interest of the class.347 Stephen Ellmann, Lawrence Grosberg, and Mark Neal
Aaronson have applied a client-centered model to group representation,
suggesting that the lawyer should pay particular attention to group dynamics
in furthering collective decisionmaking.348 The client-centered perspective on

341. See Piomelli, Democratic Roots, supra note 82, at 547-48, 598-610; Simon, supra note 69, at

485.
342. See White, supra note 26, at 538-39 (citing scholars who describe “public interest

343.

344.
345.

346.
347.
348.

litigation as a complex, multi-dimensional form of political action”); Stephen C.
Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 68.
Ellmann, supra note 28, at 1118-19 (“[T]he lawyer owes her most fundamental duty of
loyalty not to [the named plaintiffs] but to the class itself.”); Coffee, supra note 29, at
411.
See, e.g., Ellmann, supra note 28, at 1118-19; Coffee, supra note 29, at 371-72, 406-13;
Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of Class Actions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 923, 927 (1998).
Ellmann, supra note 28, at 1104-05, 1117; CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS 493 (1986) (“Despite the prominence of . . . [conflict] issues in class actions,
nothing in the professional codes addresses them directly.”).
See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 351-53 (1988).
Id. at 352.
See Ellmann, supra note 28, at 1110; Lawrence M. Grosberg, Class Actions and Client Centered Decisionmaking, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 709, 712-13 (1989); Mark Neal Aaronson,
Representing the Poor: Legal Advocacy and Welfare Reform During Reagan’s Gubernatorial
Years, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 933, 974 (2013).
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group representation emphasizes obtaining “client assent in some meaningful
form while engaging periodically in genuine client consultation.”349
The Pelican Bay litigation presents a different model of representation
from those discussed in the political, philosophical and legal literature
above.350 Instead of using the “acting for” agency model,351 we operated on an
“acting with” view of representation, characterized by the plaintiffs’ active
participation and a collective, nonhierarchical decisionmaking process.
Participatory litigation radically reorients class representation away from
either the lawyer-driven virtual model or the client-centered perspective.
Instead, it focuses on the creation of what William Simon has called
“nonhierarchical communities of interest,” which value “communication
among clients” and “direct [client] participation” in the litigation.352
Under this framework, the lawyer represents clients in court and speaks
on their behalf, but also encourages them to participate directly in the lawsuit.
The “acting with” highlights in our litigation were the meetings with the
plaintiffs prior to and during the negotiating process, class members’
contributions to our legal arguments, and, most vividly, participation of the
main representatives in the remedies mediation.
B. Were the Pelican Bay Plaintiffs Anomalous?
One could question whether the Pelican Bay experience is widely
applicable. Ironically, the plaintiffs’ extreme isolation in oppressive conditions
induced them to study law and develop significant expertise. Most other
litigators are unlikely to stumble across a similar class of plaintiffs who are
eager to participate and offer the lawyers such a wealth of knowledge.
Nonetheless, while our plaintiffs were somewhat atypical, the leadership of a
mobilized community is likely to contain potential plaintiffs and class
members who can play a participatory role.353
349. Aaronson, supra note 348, at 974; see also Grosberg, supra note 348, at 751 (suggesting

350.

351.

352.
353.

that class-action attorneys should “increase client input while informing class
members that ultimate decisionmaking responsibility rests with the class lawyer”).
Nikolas Bowie has recently argued that in the colonies and early state governments,
the right of assembly came to mean a right “to meaningfully participate in enacting
needed legislation.” Nikolas Bowie, The Constitutional Right of Self-Government, 130 YALE
L.J. 1652, 1727 (2021) (emphasis omitted). While that right could mean just the right to
elect representatives, it could also be viewed as a right to community participation—
possibly the political equivalent of participatory litigation.
This model involves direct representation of the constituency’s views by the
representative. See generally PITKIN, supra note 50, at 112-43 (discussing “acting for”
representation).
Simon, supra note 69, at 486-87.
See, e.g., LYND, supra note 25, at 25-34 (explaining that local workers’ expertise on issues
was invaluable in labor disputes); Sturm, supra note 42, at 301 (describing a case in
footnote continued on next page
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Thus, a key lesson from the Pelican Bay suit is that participatory litigation
is best achieved within the context of a mobilized, activist constituency.
Because we were representing people who had engaged in a mass hunger
strike, knew the realities and facts of their situation, and understood the legal
issues involved, our clients not only were receptive to but demanded active
participation in the lawsuit. The prisoners’ participation was enormously
beneficial throughout the case. Movement lawyers have limited time and
resources, and the Pelican Bay litigation suggests that case selection should
focus not on the underlying legal issues, but on whether there is an activist,
grassroots movement to represent. Indeed, a major reason that the CCR agreed
to represent the Pelican Bay prisoners was the movement that they had
created.
Of course, movement lawyers often litigate cases that do not arise from
mass activity. The CCR did this in its Guantanamo Bay litigation and in other
cases involving the war on terror.354 Such litigation resists oppression, speaks
truth to power, can aid in political mobilization and public education, and
perhaps can result in judicial victory. But even then, lawyers should seek
participatory opportunities for plaintiffs.
Even in situations where the plaintiffs and the class are not as engaged as
the Pelican Bay plaintiffs and class, lawyers can still use a participatory
framework. That framework does not require a fixed checklist of practices, but
instead reorients counsel to consider how to engage the named plaintiffs, class
members, family members, and community in the legal process. Participation
is not an all-or-nothing conception, but rather a continuum that must be
applied creatively in each situation. There are, of course, cases where the
plaintiffs do not wish to participate and instead would rather leave strategic
and tactical matters entirely to the lawyers. But even then, lawyers should
afford the plaintiffs the opportunity to weigh in on important decisions.
Lawyers cannot truly appreciate the possibilities for participation without
first imagining an alternative to the current mode of class-action lawyering.
David Luban’s thoughtful instruction that class lawyers should adopt the most
direct form of representation possible “under the circumstances”355 requires
which Black engineers played a crucial role in negotiating a settlement); Shauna I.
Marshall, Class Actions as Instruments of Change: Reflections on Davis v. City and County
of San Francisco, 29 U.S.F. L. Rev. 911, 939-40 (1995) (describing how plaintiffs
participated in an employment-discrimination class action); cf. White, supra note 26, at
548-49 (describing a North Carolina welfare suit in which the plaintiff ’s wife played a
crucial role).
354. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 161 (2d Cir.
2008), aff ’d en banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009); Rasul v. Bush, supra note 171 (describing
the CCR’s role in the Rasul case).
355. LUBAN, supra note 346, at 353.
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the recognition that “the circumstances” are not simply objective but socially
constructed. To the extent that lawyers recognize an obligation to explore
mechanisms for class participation, what at first appears to be daunting might
ultimately prove hospitable. Even in our case, we could have achieved greater
participation if we had thought more about how to involve class members
beyond the activist named plaintiffs.
To help ensure more participatory class representation, courts could
seriously scrutinize whether the lawyer and the named plaintiffs adequately
represent the class, as Derrick Bell suggested forty-five years ago.356 Attorneys
could also be required to secure named plaintiffs willing to actively engage in
the litigation. To be sure, such requirements may discourage lawyers from
bringing some class actions. Yet the costs seem minimal compared to the
benefits, and the class actions that would most likely be precluded are those
where the main benefit adheres to the lawyer, not the class.357
There is increasing evidence that class actions are incorporating more
participation, particularly at the settlement and remediation stages. This trend
should be encouraged. Susan Sturm has argued for third-party participation at
the remedial stage of actions involving structural injunctions.358 Samuel
Issacharoff and class-action attorney Elizabeth Cabraser have observed that in
the context of mass torts, technological developments facilitating class-wide
communication and the aggregation of actions in multidistrict litigation have
resulted in the increased participation of absent class members.359 Surely Rule
23(b)(2) class actions could make use of modern platforms such as Zoom to host
meetings of class members, a possibility not available to us in the prison
context. Francis McGovern and William Rubenstein have argued for
“negotiation class[es],” which promote class member participation in
settlement discussions,360 and Charles Sabel and William Simon demonstrate
the increasing use of innovative, “experimentalist” remedies that move away
from top-down models and instead “contemplate a permanent process of
ramifying, participatory self-revision.”361
356. Bell, supra note 57, at 508-11.
357. See Linda S. Mullenix, Taking Adequacy Seriously: The Inadequate Assessment of Adequacy

358.

359.
360.
361.

in Litigation and Settlement Classes, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1687, 1733-38 (2004) (explaining the
benefits of rigorous judicial scrutiny in selecting class counsel).
Susan P. Sturm, The Promise of Participation, 78 IOWA L. REV. 981, 981 & n.5, 983-84
(1993) (arguing for third-party inclusion and for ending the distinction of the “thirdparty” label).
Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Samuel Issacharoff, The Participatory Class Action, 92 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 846, 849-51 (2017).
Francis E. McGovern & William B. Rubenstein, The Negotiation Class: A Cooperative
Approach to Class Actions Involving Large Stakeholders, 99 TEX. L. REV. 73, 108 (2020).
Sabel & Simon, supra note 32, at 1019-20.
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That substantial participation in injunctive class actions should be
expected is implicit in the 23(b)(2) class mechanism, whereby a plaintiff class
can seek declaratory or injunctive relief because a defendant “has acted or
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class.”362 In 23(b)(2) cases,
plaintiffs can often file claims and obtain broad relief without utilizing the
class-action mechanism. But even where class certification might be viewed as
unnecessary (because an individual claim for injunctive relief could provide
full relief for the class), certification still serves the “central function” of
ensuring that class members receive adequate representation, notice, and the
chance to comment on any proposed settlement—namely, some opportunity to
participate.363
The Pelican Bay case illustrates the participatory function of 23(b)(2) class
actions. The CCR could have brought the Pelican Bay case through individual
plaintiffs, seeking a declaration that the CDCR’s policy of indeterminate
solitary confinement was unconstitutional and an injunction preventing the
enforcement of that policy. (Although we might have faced procedural hurdles,
such as individual claims being mooted or judicial reluctance to order broad
relief or discovery, those challenges are often manageable.) But instead we
chose to bring the case as a class action, in large part based on the
understanding that doing so would enable broader participation by the
incarcerated class and the named representatives. We rejected arguments to
name only a few plaintiffs for the same reason.
Class participation in 23(b)(2) class actions is therefore implicit in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and such participation should be enforced by
the judiciary. If class-action lawyers want to achieve greater class-member (or
at least class-representative) participation in their future lawsuits, the Pelican
Bay litigation provides an instructive model.
C. Participation and Successful Class-Action Impact Litigation
Perhaps the most important lesson offered by the Pelican Bay framework
involves overcoming a seemingly intractable problem: class conflicts.364 The
minimal conflict between lawyers, plaintiffs, and class members in our
litigation was due at least in part to the participatory, cooperative model we
used to build trust. We emphasized that all participants should voice their
views, respected and at times deferred to the strongly held views of others, and
362. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2); see also 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS

§§ 4:34-:35 (West 2021). I am indebted to William Rubenstein for suggesting this point.
363. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 362, § 4:35.
364. See Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1242-43
(1982) (noting that “the problem of class action conflicts” is, to a “considerable extent,
intractable”).
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expanded on the unity that had developed during the hunger strikes.
Structural, institutional mechanisms are unlikely to solve class conflicts;
instead, lawyers must exercise “an extraordinary display of ethical sensitivity
and self-restraint” to do so.365 The collaborative, consensus-building attitude of
our litigation—represented by Sitawa’s honesty, wisdom, and judgment in our
settlement discussion—was built into the fabric of the participatory
experience. Values such as restraint and respect for the collective can be built
through participation, and these values can aid not only in resolving class
conflicts366 but also in movement activities generally.367 Working with the
prisoners allowed us to experience this firsthand.
I do not believe that we would have been able to achieve the settlement
that we won but for the trust among the prisoners and lawyers. And this trust
would not have existed without everyone’s participation in the lawsuit. The
unity that almost all of the named plaintiffs maintained at the end of the
settlement process, despite tensions and conflicts, was in large part due to our
long participatory process. Our participatory, collaborative effort was thus
crucial to the successful outcome of the Pelican Bay litigation.
The Pelican Bay litigation also offers insights for the essential movement
law practice of ensuring lawyer accountability. The organization that we
represented was quite rudimentary and could not, on its own, hold lawyers
accountable. Grassroots activists and leaders were our main source of
accountability, and these parties strongly aided our endeavor. As in our
example, dynamic movements often involve mass action with only
rudimentary organization, with the rise of organizational bureaucracy
hindering the struggle and reflecting weakening activism.368 Moreover, where
the represented organization is lawyer driven, the lawyers are often
accountable only to a broader set of lawyers, not to community organizers or
leaders.369 Thus, even when movement lawyers represent organizations, they
should attempt to include individual, activist plaintiffs—perhaps grassroots
365. Bell, supra note 57, at 505; see also LUBAN, supra note 346, at 354; Susan D. Carle, Power as

a Factor in Lawyers’ Ethical Deliberation, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 115, 169 (2006).
366. See Marshall, supra note 353, at 940-47 (discussing the role of participation in resolving

conflicts in an employment-discrimination class action).
367. See William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group
Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1655-56 (1997)
(“[T]he process of democratic decisionmaking . . . [could] increase the individuals’ sense
of belonging to the community, and could further the civic republican’s muchidealized community discourse.” (footnote omitted)).
368. See FRANCIS FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS: WHY
THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL, at xii (1977).
369. Telephone Interview with Brian Wolfman, Former Dir., Pub. Citizen Litig. Grp.
(Jan. 12, 2021).
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members of the organization—who can engage in collective strategizing
around the case.370
The plaintiffs’ involvement in political organizing does not replace the
need for transforming the nature of legal representation. Our strategy
depended on both legal and extralegal advocacy: It was important that the
plaintiffs engaged in three hunger strikes, and it was equally important that
the plaintiffs played a role in their own litigation.
One could object to this analysis, arguing that while the prisoners did
indisputably participate in the litigation, they were still subordinate to the
lawyers who spoke for and represented them. The forums in which the
prisoners spoke for themselves, negotiated on their own with CDCR officials,
led the struggle, and began to create new legal norms were their three hunger
strikes. The standard movement account could describe our Pelican Bay
struggle as such: Attorneys led the legal battle with client input, and the
prisoners, aided by the litigation, engaged in organizing and political action.
But even this division of labor challenges hierarchy and the dominance of
expertise by subordinating the legal to the political. In any case, the above
critique minimizes the significance of the prisoners’ participation in the
litigation itself, which was critical to our success.
The Pelican Bay litigation highlights the importance of multifaceted
movement advocacy that leans on mass struggle led by marginalized groups.
But fundamental societal transformation requires changing the manner of
litigation in addition to its context. In the Pelican Bay struggle, the plaintiffs’
litigation experience would have been considerably different and less
satisfying had we simply aided their hunger strikes and litigated the class
action in a traditional hierarchical manner.371 The collaborative effort
between the lawyers and prisoners aided in providing the prisoners with what
Terry Kupers refers to as “a sense of agency,” which proved important in
successfully litigating the case.372 While our efforts to democratize the
litigation were only partially successful, they point to a pathway for future
efforts.
370. For example, in the Montgomery bus boycott litigation, the plaintiffs were grassroots

individuals and leaders of movements and not the Montgomery Improvement
Association, even though the Association was a key entity supporting the lawsuit.
Guinier & Torres, supra note 18, at 2778-81. See generally Randall Kennedy, Martin
Luther King’s Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999,
1049 (1989).
371. See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 94-95 (1988); Sturm, supra note 358, at 996-97.
372. KUPERS, supra note 115, at 176 (capitalization altered). I am indebted to plaintiff Todd
Ashker for making this point and for referring me to Kupers’s mention of the concept
of agency.
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D. Overcoming the Hierarchy of Expertise
Finally, the Pelican Bay litigation had some success in overcoming the
hierarchy of expertise that affects many lawyer–client relationships,
particularly in impact litigation. The lawyers, of course, had the significant
expertise required to litigate the case. But the named plaintiffs and class
members also had expertise, and not simply regarding the prison regime and
the harm it had inflicted upon them. The prisoners had expertise in the
strategy, tactics, and law central to the suit. Some of the plaintiffs could be
considered Gramsci’s organic intellectuals, constituting “the thinking and
organising element of a particular fundamental social class,”373 or as Mari
Matsuda describes, “grass roots philosophers who are uniquely able to relate
theory to the concrete experience of oppression.”374 This description fits
prisoners such as Todd Ashker, who had read philosophy, politics, and
neuroscience, and suggested expert witnesses to the lawyers (some of whom we
used); Antonio Guillen, who profoundly analyzed social relations in a carceral
setting; Sitawa Jamaa, who was steeped in radical Black-nationalist thought yet
understood the need for unity; and Edwardo Dumbrique, who had resisted his
solitary confinement by mastering the law of incarceration. Working with
and learning from each of these men encapsulates the importance of relating
theory to practice. Imagining a more egalitarian society requires developing
nonhegemonic relationships between professionals and the people with whom
they work, based in part on the recognition of different forms of intelligence
and expertise.
The Pelican Bay litigation suggests that the unclear divide between goals
(client decisions) and means (lawyer decisions) contained in the ethical rules375
does not capture essential aspects of how litigation decisions ought to be made,
and that this divide should be modified if not scrapped. Legal expertise is
certainly critical to many decisions, but where the clients had strong opinions
on matters of importance to them that could be characterized as tactical or
technical, our collaborative, participatory model accorded those views
significant respect and deference. But that did not mean that the lawyers
automatically deferred to the clients’ views. Instead, the decision was a
complex, mutual one informed by the strength of the different views, the
relative importance of the matter, and the expertise involved—not whether
the issue could be defined as a technical legal matter or a client goal.
373. Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith, Introduction to ANTONIO GRAMSCI, The

Intellectuals, in SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI 3, 3
(Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. & trans., 1971).
374. Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 325 (1987).
375. See Rubenstein, supra note 367, at 1633-34 (recognizing that the means–goals
distinction is indefinite and ambiguous).
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Conclusion: Accompaniment
The challenge to elitist, hierarchical relations has gained traction in a wide
range of professional contexts, including law,376 humanitarian aid,377 social
work,378 academic research,379 education,380 and theology.381 I have found the
liberation theological concept of accompaniment to be the most inspiring and
insightful.382 Although I am a secular Jew, I have nonetheless found the
prophetic spiritual lens extremely helpful in understanding social-justice
work.383 Contemporary theologians have set forth a doctrine of accompanying
the poor: listening, sharing, learning, and walking with them.384 In his medical
and humanitarian work, Paul Farmer defined accompaniment to mean
traveling with someone on a lengthy journey and breaking bread with
them.385 For Farmer, “accompaniment does not privilege technical expertise
above solidarity or compassion or a willingness to tackle what may seem to be
insuperable challenges. It requires cooperation, openness, and teamwork . . . .”386
Alice and Staughton Lynd, the lawyers who first introduced me to the term,
describe accompaniment as involving “two persons exploring the way forward
together.”387
For theologians, accompaniment is rooted in praxis, which seeks to
combine theory and action. “To accompany another person is to walk with him

376. See White, supra note 24, at 760-64; LÓPEZ, supra note 20, at 70, 79-80.
377. See Farmer, supra note 287.
378. See Terry T.F. Leung, Client Participation in Managing Social Work Service—An
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383.
384.

385.
386.
387.

Unfinished Quest, 56 SOC. WORK 43, 51 (2011); Lea Zanbar, Social Workers’ Implementation
of Client Participation: What Factors Make the Difference?, 44 J. SOC. SERV. RSCH. 96, 96-97
(2018).
See Emily M.S. Houh & Kristin Kalsem, It’s Critical: Legal Participatory Action Research, 19
MICH. J. RACE & L. 287, 311-12 (2014); PATRICIA MAGUIRE, DOING PARTICIPATORY
RESEARCH: A FEMINIST APPROACH 36-41 (1987).
See PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 48 (Myra Bergman Ramos trans.,
Bloomsbury Acad., 50th anniversary ed. 2018) (2000).
See GUSTAVO GUTIÉRREZ, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION: HISTORY, POLITICS AND
SALVATION 307 (Caridad Inda & John Eagleson eds. & trans., 1973).
See LYND, supra note 25, at 5-6.
See Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools & Prophets: Justice as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1331, 133743 (1995).
See Jennie Weiss Block & Michael Griffin, Introduction to IN THE COMPANY OF THE POOR:
CONVERSATIONS WITH DR. PAUL FARMER AND FR. GUSTAVO GUTIÉRREZ 1, 5-6 (Michael
Griffin & Jennie Weiss Block eds., 2013).
Farmer, supra note 287.
Id.
LYND, supra note 25, at 4; see also LYND & LYND, supra note 25, at 93.
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or her.”388 It is active, not passive. “[T]he paradigmatic form of human action is
not simply that of ‘being with’ another but, rather, the act of ‘walking with’ the
other,” and it “incorporates both the ethical–political and the aesthetic
dimensions of human praxis.”389 The prominent liberation theologian Gustavo
Guitierrez talks of “accompaniment which is reflection.”390 Accompaniment
therefore combines the action of walking together with reflection on the
spiritual, practical, and political aspects of the joint struggle against oppression
and suffering. That concept describes our long, still unfinished, Pelican Bay
litigation journey.

388. ROBERTO S. GOIZUETA, CAMINEMOS CON JESÚS: TOWARD A HISPANIC/LATINO THEOLOGY
OF ACCOMPANIMENT 206 (1995).

389. Id.
390. Daniel G. Groody, Reimagining Accompaniment: An Interview with Paul Farmer and

Gustavo Gutiérrez, in IN THE COMPANY OF THE POOR, supra note 384, at 161, 165.
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